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A growing need among service personnel to take
collective action to protect their social and economic
status appears to have developed during the last
decade. Past studies of this phenomenon have been,
for the most part, limited to examining one means by
which collective action can be achieved — military
unions. This paper takes a broader look at collective
action in the military by examining the two basic
types of military collective action groups -- military
associations and military unions. Social, economic,
legal, and attitudinal factors which will determine
the direction and shape the means of military
collective action are considered. It is concluded
that military associations and military unions are
both capable of effectively fulfilling the collective
action needs of military personnel -- each having
unique advantages and disadvantages. Circumstances
appear to mitigate against military unionism at this
time (e.g., the present national mood against military
unions). Therefore, military associations appear to
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I. INTRODUCTION
In its April 1976 report to the President, the Defense
Manpower Commission made the following observations:
. . . Tha President, the Congress and the Secretary of
Defense, who together are viewed from below as the
collective leadership of the forces, do not always
understand the manpower impact of their actions. . . .
At top management and leadership levels, there appears
at times to oe tendencies to looK at numbers or statistics
or to adopt an impersonal quantitative approach when
dealing with personnel matters. . . .
Many members of the active forces feel dismayed and
disillusioned because of what they perceive to be neglect,
disinterest or a breach of faith on the part of their
Government. . . . [Defense Manpower Commission 1976,
p. 59, 60]
The Commission went on to warn that the civilian
leadership of the armed forces "should not give them
[service personnel] reasonable grounds for believing . . .
that they [service personnel] need representation in order
to be fairly and equitably treated."
Empirical research has shown that wnen people feel
threatened or are in a stressful situation, they tend to
socialize. In other words, people in a predicament seek out
others in the same situation to satisfy their craving for
giving and receiving sentiments, for communications, and for
the reassuring effect of sharing an opinion. If the
predicament continues, it is highly liJcely that socialized
individuals will form groups which will allow them to take
collective action. [Webber, R. 1975]
The "dismay and disillusionment" reported by the Defense
Manpower Commission appears to have had a socializing effect
on the members of the armed forces and seems to be

stimulating a need for collective action. If a perceivad
need for collective action persists or increases, what type
of collective action group will military personnel use to
insure that they are "fairly and equitably treated"?
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Past analyses of collective action in the armed forces
of the United States have focused on only one type of group
through which collective action can be achieved -- military
unions. These analyses have centered on a comparison of
conditions conducive to the formation of Western European
military unions with conditions present in the United
States. These analyses have also compared the formation of
civilian Federal employee unions to the military situation
including the executive and legislative actions which made
their formation possible. In general, the problem which
these studies have attempted to solve has been twofold: (1)
to determine the overall effect of would-be military unions
in the United States; and, (2) to determine the probability
that military unions will be formed in the United States.
These issues will be touched upon in this thesis, but are
covered only as an adjunct to the main isssue upon whicn
this paper focuses -- military collective action. The
problem which this paper will explore is: What are the
viable means by which the United States military can take
collective action? While the answer to this question is tne
main objective of this paper, answers to four other closely
related problems will also be sought. These questions are:
1. What factors have stimulated the need for collective
action in the armed forces of this nation?
2. What viable types of collective action groups exist?

What barriers will inhibit various types of military
collective action groups in this country?
What types of collective action groups will be
available to fulfill the collective action needs of
United States military personnel for the foreseeable
future?
B. DEFINITIONS
Certain terms will appear repeatedly throughout the text
of this thesis. In order to clarify their meaning and to
preclude misunderstanding, the definitions below have been
developed to assist the reader.
Collective Job- relate d Action: Any activity by two or
more persons to interfere with the performance of a military
duty. Activities included are: demonstrations, 'protests,
picketing, slowdown, work stoppage, or strike. [Department
of Defense 1977]
Civilian Leadership of the Armed Forces: Includes the
President as Commander-in-Chief and the civilian leaders of
the Department of Defense, as well as the Congress which has
constitutional responsibilities to regulate and support the
armed forces. [Defense Manpower Commission 1976]
U. S. Military Asso c iati on:, Any formal collective
action group open to military personnel of the regular armed
forces which has at least one registered congressional
lobbyist and which maintains close liaison with the military
services. It functions through lobbying, member
letter-writing campaigns, and its ties with the military
services. The association's primary and secondary

objectives are: (1) to inprove the "people programs" of the
armed forces and (2) to aid the services in fulfilling their
hardware needs.
Military Col lective Act ion Groug: Any formal or
informal collection or assemblage of military personnel who
have joined together to achieve one or more social and/or
economic objectives which would affect terms or conditions
of military service. This term covers the entire spectrum
of groups which could be formed for this purpose. At one
end of the spectrum would be found a group consisting of not
less than two service members who have informally joined
together to voice a common position concerning a military
related matter which they support or oppose (for this
definition to apply, this mutual position must be conveyed
up the chain-of-command or directly to a member of the
Executive Branch or Legislative Branch of the Government) .
Near the other end of the spectrum would be military unions.
Between these two extremes would be military associations.
Militarx Institutional Benefits; Non-cash compensation
(food, housing, medical, uniforms, etc.), subsidized
consumer facilities, payments to service members partly
determined by family size, and a large proportion of
compensation received as deferred pay in the form of
retirement benefits. These benefits are often referred to
as "people programs." [Moskos 1973]
U.S^ Military Union: Any formal collective action
group open to military personnel of the regular armed forces
which has at least one registered congressional lobbyist.
It functions through lobbying, member letter- writing
campaigns, and collective bargaining. The union's
objectives are to improve the working conditions and pay of
its members. Legally, it is not allowed to take collective




Two of the above definitions, military associations and
military unions, have been purposely structured to reflect
not only a possible "real world" situation but also to allow
for ease of comparison between these two forms of collective
action groups. For these reasons, the association
definition is ^modeled after six of the more aggressive
military-oriented groups that call themselves military
associations. For the same reasons, the military union
definition is modeled after the conservative Federal sector
civilian employee unions which are restricted from certain
union activities; this type of union has been used as the
military union model because, logically, one could not
expect a military union to be allowed a broader range of




II. FACTORS STIMOLATING COLLECTIVE ACTION
Just 10 years ago the idea that many military personnel
would one day feel a growing need to take collective action
against the leadership of the armed forces was not only
unheard of but was also unthinkable. During the intervening
time-span many things have changed to cause the subject of
military collective action in the form of military aniens to
gain national attention and to become one of the more
serious manpower problems facing the military establishment
today.
What factors have caused this change? Three factors
which seem to have been the most influential are: societal
forces, reduced satisfaction of the safety and security need
(i.e., increased uncertainty regarding the level of future
compensation and benefits) , and linkage of civilian and
military pay in the Federal sector.
A. SOCIETAL FORCES
Since 1945, the armed forces have been increasingly
involved in an endless process of adjustment to countless
changes in the world. Today the armed forces differ greatly
from the forces fighting in World War II or the Korean War.
Indeed, little in the way of comparison remains. However,
the greatest changes have occurred in the armed forces' role
in society and in its manpower requirements. Today the
armed forces are expected to play a part in achieving the
nation's social goals by: (1) helping to improve the
12

economic standing of the disadvantaged segment of the
population; and, (2) changing prejudiced attitudes regarding
race, creed, and religion. While playing a icey part in
achieving the nation's social goals, the services must also
concern themselves wi'th attracting brighter and more highly
educated personnel than ever before to man the increasingly
complex weapons systems that are being developed and put
into service.
In addition, great changes have taken place in the
people who man the nation's defenses. Their needs, wants,
and aspirations have altered to the point where these are
more a reflection of contemporary society than the military
society of their predecessors.
Dr. Charles C. Moskos, one of the foremost military
sociologists, has hypothesized that these changes are
evidence of a growing convergence between the military and
civilian forms of society. Inducing this convergence,
according to the hypothesis, are technological advances
which have led to the development of sophisticated weapons
systems. Moskos believes that these systems are having a
great social effect on the armed forces because they give
rise to not only a need for increased technical proficiency,
but also for managerial and modern decision-making skills of
the type used by large civilian corporations. In turn, the
use of civilian developed decision-making skills by the
military is causing a trend away from authority based on
"domination" and toward a more civilianized managerial
philosophy which places greater stress on persuasion and
individual initiative. [Moskos 1973]
Assuming this hypothesis is correct, military society
could be expected to take on increasingly the
characteristics of civilian society. To some, these
civilian-related characteristics are already apparent-
13

Included are: an increasing pressure for wider
participation in decision- making by junior officers and
enlisted personnel [Krendel 1975]; a growing egalitarian
ethic among enlisted personnel [ Atwies 1976]; a growing
tendency for military personnel to think of themselves as
specialists and to maintain a commitment to their specialty
or trade instead of the general military profession [Hartley
1969]; and, the blurring of what is strictly a military
function and what is not, as civilians perform an
ever-increasing number of traditionally military tasks
[Famiglietti 1975].
But, is military society really converging with civilian
society or just following along behind? Another and more
persuasive view articulated by Colonel Jennings, USA (Ret.)#
contends that the changing characteristics noted above are
quite likely the manifestation of a long existing
relationship between civilian and military societies. This
relationship, simply put, means that as the norms of the
more liberal civilian society have changed, they have
dragged along the lagging norms of the more conservative
military society. Therefore, what has been hypothesized as
a liberalized military society on the verge of colliding
with civilian society is in all likelihood an evolutionary
process that has been going on for a very long time.
[Jennings 19 76]
A key point of the Jennings article is that the distance
between the two societies is not rigidly fixed but is
elastic. The elasticity characteristic of the relationship
between the two societies -- military and civilian -- has
been exemplified by a significant change which caused the
existing interval to shorten during this decade. This
change was brought about by the implementation of the
all-volunteer force concept and a resulting alteration in
the notion of why one serves in the armed forces.
14

Probably more than any other event, the termination of
the selective service system and the implementation of the
all-volunteer concept has had the most dramatic effect on
the military society in the past guarter century. Despite
the fact that this concept was brought into being as a
political expedient. Dr. Janowitz, an eminent military
sociologist, views its implementation as an inevitable step
in the sociological evolution of the armed forces [Janowitz
1977 ].
Accompanying the advent of the all-voluntser force was a
change in the traditional notion of patriotic service in the
armed forces of the nation. Today, this notion has alraos-c
completely disappeared. Two factors which share the blame
for this social change are: (1) the anti-military sentiment
which developed as a result of the anti-war movement of the
Vietnam era; and, (2) an increasing laclc of creditability in
the need for a large-standing armed force in an era of
detente [Taylor, J. 1976]. However, the primary factor that
caused this change was the method by which the all- volunteer
force was recruited.
Starting in the early 1970' s, the Federal Government
began following one of the recommendations of the
President's Commission on an All- Volunteer Force. This
recommendation called for the placing of primary reliance on
monetary incentives based on marketplace standards to
recruit a volunteer force instead of the traditional
institutional benefits. The Commission's recommendation
stated:
... We have decided against recommending general
increases in such benefits. ... We have done
so . . . because we believe that general increases in
such benefits in non-cash pay would be an inefficient
means of compensating military personnel. [Gates
Commission 1970, p. 63]
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Currently, a widely held belief by military sociologists
is that this approach to recruitment has changed the idea of
military service from a "calling" to that of a "job like any
other." To explain the implications of this belief and the
meaning of this change, it is necessary to understand the
institutional and occupational models of the military
society.
The institutional model or "calling" has been the
traditional social model of the armed forces. It portrays
military-man as dedicated to values -- duty, honor, and
country — which transcend individual self-interest in favor
of a presumed higher good. Also, military-man is depicted as
regarding himself as being different from those not in his
profession and in a separate society from the prevailing
society of the nation — a view shared, in general, by the
nation. Associated with this model are notions of
self'sacrifice and complete dedication to one's role which
is rewarded by high esteem from the nation. Even though
cash pay comparable to that which would be expected in the
economy of the marketplace is not obtained, the deficiency
is offset by social esteem and institutional benefits made
available through a paternalistic remuneration system. When
grievances are felt, military-man does not organize
self-interest groups. Rather, if redress is sought, it is
dealt with on a one-on-one basis between the individual and
his superior. Implied in this method of solving grievances
is a trust in the paternalism of the institution to take
care of its cwn. [Moskos 1977]
The occupational model portrays military-man as seeking
monetary rewards eguivalent to those found in the economy of
the marketplace. His salary system incorporates basic pay
and institutional benefits of a "calling" into one lump sum
cash payment. He has rights in determining an appropriate
16

salary and working conditions. These rights are
counterbalanced by responsibilities to meet a contractual
obligation. Military-man's first priority is self-interest
rather than the task itself or the particular branch of
service to which he belongs and he is seen as advancing his
self-interests through the union form of collective
action. [ Moskos 1977]
Dr. Moskos believes that the trend in the armed forces
today is away from the institutional model and towards the
occupational model. Since the common form of advancing
interests in the occupational model is the union form of
collective action, this implies an increasing likelihood of
it becoming the dominant form of collective action in the
military.
Moskos* s view has been endorsed by Air Force Chief of
Staff General Jones. The General, like Moskos, sees a
fundamental shift in motivation from a "calling" toward an
occupation where the first priority is self-interest rather
than the organization. This trend, he oelieves, could lead
to military unions. [Jones 1977]
The General Counsel of the American Federation of
Government Employees seams to have echoed these views in an
interview in which he stated:
It's a volunteer Army, and that means people are selecting
a military career as a means of livelihood and not for
patriotic reasons. Servicemen today aren't responding to
an attack on the country. They want to be paid. [Parnell
1977, p. 19]
To support his belief. Dr. Moskos has identified a
number of indicators which he believes reveal a trend toward
the ascendency of the occupatiocal model and the likelihood
of military unions in the social organization of the
all-volunteer armed force. Among these indicators are:
17

1. The significant pay increases given to the armed
forces since 1971 in an effort to make military
compensation competitive with civilian rates
2. Recommendations by government panels to establish a
military salary system
3. Proposals to eliminate or reduce an array of
institutional benefits
4. The separation of work and residence locales by a
growing proportion of single enlisted members of the
armed forces who are living off-base
5. The incipient resistance of many military wives at the
officer and noncommissioned officer levels to taking
part in customary social functions
6. The high attrition and desertion rates among enlisted
personnel [Moskos 1977]
B. LINKAGE WITH CIVILIAN FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
A second force stimulating the formation of military
collective action groups, particularly of the union variety,
is the linkage of military and nonmilitary pay systems in
the Federal sector.
In 1962, the Federal Salary Reform Act was adopted for
the General Schedule and the principle of comparability went
into effect. The application of the comparability principle
to the wages paid to General Schedule employees seemed a
rational approach to setting compensation since it aligned




In 1967, Public Law 90-207 came iato being and brought
with it the present method of annually adjusting the level
of military compensation. The law rigidly linked the
military pay schedule with the General Schedule. Since
1967, several modifications to the original act have been
made. [Defense Manpower Commission 1976]
Under present legislation, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget and the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission have been designated by the President to act as
his Pay Agent. The Pay Agent prepares an annual report
based on surveys by the Bureau of Laiaor Statistics comparing-
Federal and private enterprise salary rates. After
consulting with a five-member Federal Employees Pay Council
and other employee organizations, the Pay Agent's
recommendations and the views of employee organizations are
reviewed by a three-member Advisory Committee on Federal pay
and then sent to the President. The President may accept
the recommendations, in which case, they become law.
[Defense Manpower Commission 1976]
If a national emergency or economic conditions affecting
the national welfare exist, the President may submit an
alternate plan to Congress in lieu of the required
comparability adjustment. The alternate plan, if submitted,
becomes law unless a simple majority of either house passes
a resolution of disapproval within a limited time period.
[Defense Manpower Commission 1976]
Since passage of comparability legislation, there has
never been a direct attempt by the President to adjust the
pay schedule submitted by his Pay Agent. However, the
President has submitted alternate pay plans to Congress
which have had the same effect. [Spaith 1976], The




Section Eight of Public Law 90-'207, the Section
providing linkage, is known as the "Hivers* Amendment" and
was named after Representative Mendel Hivers, Chairman of
the House Armed Services Committee and foremost "champion of
the military." Little could this staunch conservative from
South Carolina have ever imagined that one of the many
measures which he pushed through Congress in the best
interest of "our service boys," would provide the link that
would eventually cause organized labor to see the
non-unionized millions in the armed forces as a logical
extension of their membership.
The specific spark which ignited the fire was President
Ford's alternate pay plan for the 1974 pay increase. In a
1975 interview, the since deceased President of the American
Federation cf Government Employees (AFGE) , Clyde M. Webber,
described the events which led his union to start seeing the
military as a potential membership source as follows:
. . . [In] 1973, the President was apparently fascinated
with this device o£ picking off half a billion dollars.
If you give a four percent increase in pay and you defer
it for 90 days, that's equivalent to one percent, which is
nearly 400 million. . . . Then each year they say, well,
here's a little way to get some money Dack into the
Treasury, regardless of what the equities or the situation
are. ...
We went to the Senate that year and we got about an
85-14 vote rejecting his alternate pay plan, and we got
our pay increase on time. In 1974, when president Nixon
resigned, we breathed a little sigh of relief. ... At
that time, the inflation rate was 12 percent a year. And
you can imagine what fthe administration] came ud with —
5.5 percent. With Ford in office less than two weeks, the
statutory deadline [for pay increase] came, and his
financial advisors recommended to him that he defer. So
he deferred.
And here we have a new President on a honeymoon with
the voters and the Congress and we were quite concerned,
extremely concerned. So I got to thinking about it. And
I thought, well, hell, you know, we're not the only ones
affected by this, maybe we could get a little help from
the military personnel. So I drew up a handbill -- two of
them -- one of them directed to our members and other
civilian employees in the Defense Department, and another
one directed to the military. . . . Time was very short.
We had 30 days to do this whole thing. We needed to get
51 votes in the Senate [to stop the pay deferral].
20

The people on Capitol Hill tell me that there was a
fabulous response on the part of the military personnel to
not having their pay increase set back. . . .
That's all there was to it. We didn't ask them to
join us or anything of that nature. Simply that it was in
their own self-interest that they should take some action.
So after this experiment witn a little cooperation and
finding that cooperation was mutually beneficial, then we
had some little conversations here and rhere. . . . And
we're representing these folks as far as their pay is
concerned and there may be other areas where we can have
mutual interests. [The Times Magazine 24 September 1975.
p. 24, 43]
The significance of this historic event — defeat of the
1974 alternate pay plan — is rhat for the first time, a
major labor organization had shown interest in members of
the military establishment and had in fact called upon the
armed forces rank and file for support. Also, for the first
time and probably of equal significance, military personnel
showed widespread interest, in and support for a union
lobbying campaign. -
Almost immediately the AFGS followed by other unions,
primarily those in the public sector, iaplemented a campaign
to win support for the unionization of military personnel.
To the unions this was a rational course of action for
several reasons. First, since linkage in 1967, military
personnel have been "free-riders" on all incremental pay
increases won through the lobbying efforts of the unions;
incremental increases which are, in the opinion of the
unions, over and above that which would have been otherwise
provided by the Federal Government. Second, the military
establishment represents the last untapped labor pool in the
United States which has not been unionized to at least some
degree. This is an important consideration since union
membership and resultant revenues have fallen off
significantly during this decade. Finally, a unionized
armed forces would provide additional weight to union
21

lobbying efforts through their added numbers and would cause
Congress and the nation to take Federal employee unions more
seriously than they have in the past. [Ewing October 1976]
C. REDUCED SATISFACTION OF THE SAFETY AND SECUfilTY NEED
In addition to societal forces and linkage, there is a
third reason which is providing service people with the
impetus to join collective action groups. This is the
reduced satisfaction of the safety and security need.
Maslow's basic hierarchical need model with its five
graduated levels of psychological needs serves well as a
frame of reference. Commencing at the lowest level with
physiological needs, the hierarchy transcends four levels
identified as the need for safety and security, love and
affiliation, self and social esteem, and finally, the need
for self-actualization. As one's needs at a particular
level are satisfied, primary attention is then diverted to
fulfilling the next higher level need. [Webber, R. 1975]
Generally, a failure on the part of the military and
civilian leadership of the armed forces to satisfy the
safety and security need will have a negative affect on
morale. This failure can develop, in the individual, the
underlying belief that his environment is at best capricious
and at worst malicious. The usual method of circumventing
this unfulfilled need is to enter into a relationship with a
collective action group which is able to guarantee a
reasonably secure life. [Webber, R. 1975]
Presumably, the average military member has satisfied
his physiological needs -- food and shelter — even if some
members qualify for relief and food stamps. However, full
22

satisfaction at the next level in the hierarchy is not being
achieved by a large segment of the armed forces.
[Grebeldinger 1976]
This has occurred because military personnel have
increasingly developed the perception that a hostile
government attitude toward their pay and institutional
benefits exists. They have come to believe that their pay
is a political football and that the highly touted parity
with civilian pay scales is a myth. To them, it has become
obvious that the traditional paternalistic attitude of the
Government is out of vogue. With no one to plead their case
and to protect their interests, they have rationally
concluded that their only recourse is a powerful collective
action group, such as a union, to protect and advance their
interests. [Grebeldinger 1976]
These perceptions are being caused by: (1) inadequate
communications; and, (2) apparent attitudes of top level
management within the Department of Defense, of Congress,
and of the President. To understand how these perceptions
have come about, this chapter next describes the events
leading to this development.
1 . Inadequate Communications
One of the primary responsibilities of the military
and civilian leadership of the armed forces is the
establishment and utilization of a communications system.
Communications with subordinates are the medium through
which the leadership directs the efforts of the military.
By means of its communications the leadership defines the
goals of the military establishment. These goals tell
subordinates what is expected, what resources are available
and how well they are doing. The communications from the
23

leadership are the foundation upon which the subordinates
are able to build a stable military establishment. Without
an ample flow of communications from the leadership,
subordinates cannot know what the situation is, which
direction they should be going or how well they are
performing. Without good communications subordinates are in
an insecure position. [Haire 1964]
The Defense Manpower Commission has identified
communications as a major problem that exists within the
military establishment. The Commission has pinpointed tne
location of this problem as being between the leadership of
the armed forces and the units in the field. This problem
has had a great impact on the pay and institutional benefits
issues. The Commission found that this problem has caused
members of the armed forces to feel disillusioned and
dismayed by what they perceive to be disinterest, neglect,
or a breach of faith on the part of their Government.
This breakdown in communications nas resulted in a
disjointed incremental approach to personnel problems by the
military and civilian leadership of the armed forces and the
results have been unsatisfactory. The Commission believes
the policy of changing one element of the personnel policy
without considering its impact on other elements has led to
adverse consequences that were predictable and should have
been anticipated. [Defense Manpower Commission 1976]
Another view, held by a few members of Congress,
public officials, and military leaders, has laid the blame
for inadequate communications on uniformed leaders of the
military establishment. Advocates of this view believe that
if the military leadership fully informed its people, in a
supportive and positive way, as to just how fair the pay and
benefits programs really are, the erosion of benefits issue
would rapidly subside. Chief of Naval Personnel Vice
24

Admiral Watkins does not believe this is possible at the
present time. He has responded to this view before the
Senate Armed Services Committee by stating:
That, in my opinion, is an oversimplified view which does
not recognize the real issue at hand; that is,
apprehension over future changes which no one at this time
can describe, let alone defend. Witn the Defense Manpower
Commission, the Third Quadrennial Review of Military
Compensation and now the President's Blue Ribbon Panel,
all investigating changes to the military compensation
system, it would certainly be premature, if not impossible
to assure our people that their future security
apprehensions are unfounded. Such assurances at this
point would have little creditability. [ ;<atkins 1977, p.
Captain Schratz, USN (Ret.), disagrees with Vice
Admiral Watkins and believes that important benefit
improvements have gone unnoticed as a result of neglectful
military leaders. He cites as an example the Survivor
Benefit Plan which markedly improves the serviceman's
ability to guarantee his family an income should he die
while on active duty or after retirement. Even though "no
civilian agency can match" this plan, according to Schratz,
less than half of the service personnel eligible (1.2
million) have elected to participate, with the lowest
percentage of participation among enlisted members. This
has been caused, Schratz believes, "largely through
misinformation and a failure to understand." [Schratz 1977]
One officer who had been highly supportive and
positive of pay and benefit programs and had communicated
this view to his subordinates during his career of 40 years
was Major General Sparrow, USA (Ret.). However, by 1975, he
had become so disillusioned with the trend in overall
compensation that he published an open letter of apology to
those he had urged and influenced to follow a military
career. In his letter, he cites an unwritten contract
between the soldier and the Government that has been
predicated on mutual promises — promises that have been
broken. He points out that it is not the loss of benefits
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that is important, but, "the undermining of that basic trust
and confidence in authority which is fundamental to the
ef fectivenesss of our nation's armed forces." [Sparrow
1975]
The Defense Manpower Commission nas concluded that
the solution to the inadequate communications problem must
be based on a restoration of credibility in the Government
and its personnel policies and practices, and improved
confidence of the armed forces in their leadership in
Washington. The Commission points out that achieving
stability in manpower and personnel policies and practices
will go a long way in achieving this goal. The Commission
believes:
Personnel policies and practices important to the
individual should not be changed without adequate
explanation and should be altered only in the context of a
total review of policies and practices, taking into
consideration the consequence of proposed changes. When a
policy decision is heavily influenced by cost
considerations, this should be stated openly, explained,
and not obscured by promises. Members of the armed forces
will appreciate this candor. [ Defense Manpower Commission
1976, p. 61]
Senator Thurmond in a recent article stated a very
similar and compatible view:
The creditibility of the leadership needs to be restored.
Budget considerations must be given due weight, but
keeping faith and telling the truth comes first. When
unpopular decisions must be made, we must be prepared to
explain why. Honesty should replace guile. Our military
feople have always recognized- respected, and accepted the
ruth. [Thurmond 1,977, p. 25]
2« Attitudes of To£ Manage ment Within DoD
Although the ending of conscription was viewed as a
wise move by many, it brought with it a problem — greatly
increased manpower costs — which was either disregarded at
the time or was not considered important. In turn, sharply
increased military manpower expenses activated one of the
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key factors leading to an increased interest in collective
action. This factor has been the failure of top civilian
managers of the Department of Defense to give proper weight
to the human element in their understandable preoccupation
with much-needed weapons modernization. According to the
Executive Editor of The Retired Officer, they have yet to
"grasp the idea that a career in the military service is
unique and that, unlike most jobs with civilian
corporations, it requires complete dedication and loyalty on
the part of the individual and involves the entire family as
well." [ Lien 1975]
Since 1968, the Secretary of Defense has watched
manpower costs increase from 42 percent to 58 percent
(estimated) of the defense budget in 1977. This increase
occurred despite a 37 percent reduction in civilian and
military manpower during the same- period. [Defense Manpower
Commission 1976]
faced with general spending constraints, inflation,
and a continuing need for nore modern and ever more
expensive weapons systems, the Secretary of Defense
determined as early as 1972 that rising manpower expenses
would have to be cut. From a budgetary viewpoint, it was
determined that this was the only acceptable alternative
which would allow significant numbers of dollars to be freed
for needed hardware. Since manpower had already been cut by
a 37 percent reduction in force, further cuts in the numbers
of personnel was considered infeasible. This left overall
compensation as the only choice available.
The tampering with overall civilian compensation was
not possible due to numerous safeguards, contractual
arrangements, and Executive Order 11491, as amended, which
enabled Federal civilian employees to collectively bargain
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through their labor unions. This left only the overall
compensation paid to military personnel as the area
available to be cut.
Many of the measures studied or adopted affected
institutional benefits. Although military personnel had
long viewed these benefits as entitlements which were
implicit parts of an implied military contract, the
Secretary of Defense increasingly began to attack these
entitlements. The Secretary's view was that these benefits
were not in perpetuity and certainly not contractual rights
[Taylor, W. 1976]
Although well-intentioned and designed to improve
national defense within given constraints, the policy of
cutting manpower conpensation to free dollars for hardware
needs failed to consider the most valuable weapon system in
the Department of Defense inventory — the individual
service member. This may have occurred either 'because of
"isolation", a not uncommon problem ox top level management
in a large hierarchical organization, or an insensitivity to
the effect that this policy would have on "the spirit of the
organization" [DrucJcer 1954]. Had the Secretary understood
the true cost-benefit relationship between reduced morale
and manpower conpensation dollars saved, it is possible that
another alternative would have been found.
However, as the intentions of top-rlevel defense
planners became clearer, the defense establishment divided
into two groups. The first group supported and still
supports the reductions in overall military compensation and
is made up of the Secretary of Defense and his staff. Thay
have talcen what many have viewed as the "us against them"
approach to solving the manpower cost problem. This is the
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same approach which has been used by big business many times
in the past and has been the inspiration behind the
unionization movement in the private sector.
The service secretaries, supported by the service
chiefs, generally take the opposite view. They have acted
as ombudsmen for military personnel and take the view that
the current piecemeal approach of reducing overall
compensation is improper. However, they do believe that if
and when such cost reduction measures are necessary, the
reasoning behind the changes should be fully explained to
service members. [Shoemaker 1977 and Callander 1977]
The disagreement between these two opposing groups
has repeatedly boiled over into public view. The first
major confrontation occurred in 1974 when Secretary of the
Navy Middendorf challenged Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
to show proof of his commitment to service members.
iaiddendorf believed that Schlesinger lacked commitment
because of 14 benefits which had been reduced under his
leadership. [Farrington 1976]
In 1975 Assistant Secretary of the Navy Beaumont
told the Defense Manpower Commission that the Defense
Department was fantastically naive about what service
members will suffer. He considered it a perplexing
phenomenon that the members of the armed forces had not
previously organized a union. [Schweitz 1975]
The disagreement continued in 1976. Speaking before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, Assistant Secretary of
the Air Porce Taylor expressed his concern over top level
Department of Defense policies;
We are nickel and diming our force into a great morale
problem. I don't tlame the force for being concerned. . .
I agree [that the] piecemealing of benefits has created
a problem. We have to do a better job with our people. .
. . The people we have . . . don't join the force because
of the money involved. They join for a variety of reasons
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and they desire to be treated fairly. [Air Force Times 16
February 1976, p. 3] ~ .
In a 1977 Navy Times article, former Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
Hittle questioned the intent of the Secretary of Defense's
action to combine the office of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Logistics with the office of
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs. He believed that this action was a downgrading in
importance of military manpower at the highest level in the
department. [Hittle 1977]
By February 1977, the service secretaries had become
very concerned that the Secretary of Defense's policies
toward military manpower and overall compensation were
causing a morale problem. As a result, they asked that he
call a moratorium on military pay and benefits. In so doing
they joined the Joint Chiefs of Staff who had made a similar
request of the President the year before. [Shoemaker 1977
and Callander 1977 ]
Spokesmen for the Secretary of Defense have
acknowledged that morale among military personnel has
suffered as a result of yearly piecemeal reductions in
long-standing benefits and arbitrary changes in the military
pay system. However, they believe that neither budget
management responsiblities can be abdicated nor overall
compensation changes be halted. [Swing and Stevens February
1976 and Callander 1977]
Regardless of the actual support for military pay
and benefit programs at the highest levels in the Department
of Defense, this final view by Defense spokesmen appears to
be the one that many military personnel see as the dominant
one. Views of this type are the ones upon which service
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members have based their perceptions of a nonsuppcrtive
military establishment.
3. Congressional Attitud es
The Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, charges
Congress with the responsibility of raising and supporting
the nation's armed forces. Historically, this is a role
that Congress has not taken lightly. Lieutenant Colonel
Quinn, et al., described the traditional role that Congress
has played in its relationship with the military as
paternalistic. For over 200 years:
. . . a paternalistic system has developed within which
members or the military service have enjoyed a direct
Congressional interest in their total welfare. The United
States Government has historically provided for wages,
housing, and rules for treatment of the members of tne
armed forces, and has taken an interest in the social
welfare of the servicemen. Indeed, 'champions of the
military' have long existed for the American fighting man
. . . [Quinn 1971, p. 52]
After the Vietnam war, however. Congress's
paternalistic attitude was replaced by skepticism. This new
attitude was a reflection of the prevailing feelings of the
nation toward the armed forces. It became stylish for
politicians to ridicule the military estaialishment and "the
military-industrial complex." As a result, the traditional
areas of support for the military began to disappear. [Rice
1974]
Successful assaults on the seniority system by young
liberals in Congress removed long-standing and powerful
advocates of the military, such as Congressman Hebert from
his position as the Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee [ Hsfti 1977]. Skepticism and changes in the
membership of Congressional Armed Services Committees
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brought numerous proposals to reduce the traditional
institutional benefits of military personnel to the floor of
Congress.
The proposed changes were viewed by many service
members as part of a relentless attack on their livelihood
and prestige. To them, these benefits have a symbolic
significance that is far in excess of their dollar value and
their continuation' represents a symbolic expression of
national appreciation [Kahn, 1974]. In 1976, the Defense
Manpower Commission recognized this fact. They warned that
changes to the institutional benefits would have a
far-reaching impact on the ability of the armed forces to
attract and retain personnel because of their effect on
morale and sense of identity of military personnel.
[Defense Manpower Commission 1976]
However, in an attempt to gain stature, prestige,
and win votes in the next election, this fact has gone
largely unnoticed by some members of Congress. This group
of legislators has loudly vocalized their support for
proposals which would cut institutional benefits enjoyed by
service members. Their approach has been effective in at
least two ways. First, it has caused the Air Force Times,
Army Ti mes, and Nav^ Times to give broad coverage to the
legislators' stand. Second, it has lowered the morale and
sense of security among members of the military by giving
them an uncertain picture of the future. The second effect
has remained largely unaltered even when, as in numerous
cases, the proposed legislation later dies in Congress.
The disenchantment of service people with Congress
has been played upon by collective action groups such as
military associations and labor organizations. Through
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lobbying efforts, the media, and other means available,
these groups have made this dissatisfaction known to
Congress.
Continually bombarded by complaints from these
collective action groups and the individual serviceman
himself. Congress has apparently split into several factions
over the issue of armed forces institutional benefits. One
faction has become hostile toward the armed forces and
expressions of dissatisfaction from the military ranks. An
example of this sentiment was expressed by Representative
Stratton in 1975:
... I am getting a little tired of this constant
allusion to contractual rights when it comes to military
benefits. The fact is that money for defense is getting
harder and harder to come by here in Congress. ... rfe
can't get enough money to maintain our basic defense
Eosture. ... We are running into the same situation
ere that we found in New York City. vJhile the mayor and
the governor were in Washington begging for financial
assistance, some of the city's unions were threatening to
tie the city up with a general strike because thev were
not getting the annual cost-of-living increase called for
in. their contracts. . . . How can one possibly insist on
maintaining the status quo without any change when there
isn't even enough money to pay for the basic operations? .
. . [ Stevens 1975, p. 14
]
Senator Goldwater, responding to this type of view,
has said he believes that congressmen who have urged a
reduction in military benefits to save money are
hypocritical since "no group in the United States has more
fringe benefits than congressmen." [Cooper 1975]
Representative Davis believes the dissatisfaction in
the armed forces and the erosion of benefits issue has been
caused by the press. He has stated that:
If you can take the Army Times, the Navy Times, and the
Air Force Times off inslaTlaOIons, you wouXdn''"^ have any
of ^is sfull [about erosion of benefits-]. All you have
to do is have one person say one word and all of a sudden
newspapers call it erosion of benefits. ... If you take
those [service newspapers] off the newsracks, you can save




Another congressional faction understands that there
is disenchantment among the ranks of the service members
but, according to the Navx Times, has missed the point and
is looking into ways to improve the grievance procedure
within the military establishment as the key solution to the
problem- The newspaper has concluded that military
personnel are much less worried about representation under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice or inspector general
system than they are about the security of their future in
the military. [Plattner 1977]. This view was substantiated
by Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Walker during his
appearance before the House Military Personnel Subcommittee
r N avy Times 15 August 1977].
A third congressional faction has continued the
historic paternalism mentioned earlier. The goal of this
faction is to develop a rational and stable system of pay
and benefits that is fair not only to tne servicemen but to
the taxpayer as well. [Plattner 1977]. Senator Thurmond, a
leader of this faction, believes:
... Servicemen regard their government as insensitive to
their problems and unresponsive to their needs.
Frustrated and disillusioned, they have become suscectible
to the wiles of seif-interesed union advocates. . . ".
This problem of morale must be faced immediately.
Loyalty must go from the top down as well as from tne
bottom up. Our military service members have a right to
expect loyalty from the commander-in-chief. Congress, and
the uniformed leadership of the armed services. [Thurmond
1977, p. 24]
Even though there are staunch supporters of military
personnel in Congress, the message that members of the armed
forces are receiving is that Congress is indifferent or
hostile to their needs. The Defense Manpower Commission has
pointed out that, for whatever the reason, servicemen feel
that their benefits are in jeopardy, and their "trust and
confidence in the system [has] been shaken to the point
where legislation may be necessary to restore it." To
accomplish this, xhe Commission suggests that a
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"Serviceman's Bill of Rights" to specify and guarantee
service benefits may be necessary. To date, this suggestion
is not being seriously considered in Congress. [Defense
Manpower Commission 1976]
'^' Presidential Attitudes
Successful commanders at all levels have learned
that to obtain the most out of their subordinates, they must
maintain a vigilance over the subordinates' welfare and must
be a loyal supporter of the means to satisfy their needs. In
turn, the commander gets loyalty and support. Actions of
the President in recent years have caused service members to
have doubts concerning the Commander-in-Chief's support of
their needs. The most obvious and clear-cut example of the
President's questionable support is his stand on
compensation in recent years.
In 1971, President Nixon submitted the first of five
alternate pay plans to be put before Congress during tne
Nixon-Pord Presidential reign. The first four attempts at
altering the Pay Agent's proposed pay schedule, by delaying
increases beyond the date established by law, were
overridden. One of these attempts was overturned through
court action and the other three were defeated in Congress.
In 1974, the Advisory Commission on j?ederal Pay, composed of
members not employed by the Federal Government, expressed
its concern over repeated attempts by the President to delay
or reduce the annually revised pay schedules. The Commission
stated: "It is imperative that an alternative plan be
invoked only under extraordinary circumstances as an




President Ford decided to disregard the advice of
the Advisory Commission and in the very next year, 1975,
submitted the fifth alternative pay plan to Congress. This
plan was successful because Congress took no action. It
consisted of a five percent across-the-board increase
instead of the 8.66 recommended by the Pay Agent. [Defense
Manpower Commission 1976]
The President' s past actions on compensation have
been viewed with concern by members of the armed forces.
They have perceived an unfairness in these actions and a
contradiction in the term, equity. They have seen federal
legislation established to achieve compensation parity with
the private sector. At the same time, they have seen the
President demonstrating greater concern for matters other
than comparability. For the future, they fear that they
will continue to suffer inequality with workers in the
private sector. This fear is reinforced daily by comments
from officials of the government. Upon submitting his 1976
budget to Congress, President Ford declared that he had
"carved personnel spending to the bone" to gain funds for
military hardware. [Cooper 1976]
The President's stand on past pay increases and its
effect on the morale of the armed forces moved the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in 1976 to appeal to the Commander-in-Chief
for a one-year moratorium on compensation adjustments which
the members of the armed forces perceive as unfair
[Callander 1977]. Despite this plea and a 1977 plea by the
service secretaries for a moratorium. President Carter has
identified military compensation as one area that he intends




Several significant factors impact on the legal
environment in which service members can take collective
action. This environment is not stable and is constantly
changing over time as are the norms of American society.
Effecting this changing environment are laws passed by
Congress and approved by the President, presidential and
Department of Defense regulations, and decisions of the
courts. Since the United States is a democratic republic,
it must be assumed that these laws and regulations reflect
the will of the people or, at least, what their elected
officials have determined is best for the nation. However,
in the end, the Constitution and the decisions of the
Supreme Court have the final say regarding the
constitutionality of various laws and establish the legal
environment at a specific point in time. The words,
"specific point in time," must be emphasized since both the
Constitution and the decisions of the Supreme Court have!
changed over the years to reflect the norms of the nation.
The degree to which military personnel can take
collective action and the groups which they can join to
achieve collective action are restricted to a far greater
extent than any other segment of the nation's population,
except for those incarcerated for various crimes. To
understand the rationale behind the limits placed on the
constitutional rights of service personnel and to determine
the extent to which they can take collective action, this
chapter examines: (1) the rights of each citizen provided
by the First Amendment; (2) some of the more important court
decisions which are relevant to understanding the court
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system's position; and, (3) the restrictions placed upon the
constitutional rights of military personnel by the Congress,
the President, and the Secretary of Defense.
A. THE FIHST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment indicates that, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for redress of grievances." The Supreme Court has held that
the First Amendment is the cornerstone of the American
democratic system of government [New York Times v^ Sullivan
1964] and has subjected laws and even executive decisions
which have the force of law to intense scrutiny to assure
there is no abrogation of its intent [Webber, C. 1975].
In the United States, the military establishment is
unique because its uniformed members are subject to a dual
system of military and civilian jurisprudence. Regardless
of this fact. First Amendment rights still apply to service
personnel. However, a recognized legitimate necessity can
and does restrict these rights. For example, when a
compelling state interest, such as providing for the common
defense, would be placed in jeopardy, the rights of service
personnel must give way. This constraint requires the
courts, in arriving at their decisions, to strike a balance
in determining the extent to which the rights of military
personnel are restricted. [ Grebeldinger 1976]
Balance is difficult to acquire and maintain. This is
because the interaction of circumstances and the relative
magnitude of competing interests is a dynamic process in
which many interdependent variables are simultaneously
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considered. Further complicating the situation is the fact
that the outcome can have an impact on national security.
As a result, the courts have included in their rulings the
concept of military necessity which roughly means that the
aforementioned variables have been taken into consideration
in an attempt to achieve balance. [ Grebeldinger 1976]
A precise definition for the concept of military
necessity is difficult to develop because factors such as
time, place, and circumstances must be considered in
determining the outcome of each case. The importance of
words or deeds varies depending on these factors. For
example, did the incident occur: overseas or in the United
States; during peace or war; in the front lines or in the
rear echelons; in front of civilians or service personnel;
in civilian clothes or uniform; or, by an enlisted person or
officer? These factors -- time, place, and circumstances —
combined with military necessity are balanced against an
infringement of the individual's rights under the First
Amendment. This is done to determine whether the rights of
military personnel should be restricted by a higher need of
the nation. [Grebeldinger 1976]
The concept of military necessity has been addressed on
many occasions in military courts. For example, in 1957,
the Court of Military Appeals applied this concept in
reviewing a case involving an officer who carried
anti-government signs in a Vietnam war protest march while
off-post, off-duty, and in civilian clothes. In the Court's
opinion:
We need not determine whether a state of war presently
exists. We do judicially know that hundreds of thousands
of members of our military forces are committed to combat
in Vietnam, casualties among our forces are heavy, and
thousands are being recruited, or drafted, into our armed
forces. That in the present times and circumstances such
conduct by an officer constitutes a clear and present
danger to discipline within our armed services, under the
(civilian) precedents established by the Supreme Court,
seems to require no argument. [United States v. Howe
39

Over the past 25 years the Supreme Court has broadened
the protection of the rights granted in the First Amendment
to include an implied right — freedom of association. This
freedom was spelled out in a Supreme Court decision which
held "... that if prospective laws place excessive,
over- burdens on the protected exercise of Federal employees'
freedom of association. Congress cannot enact said
legislation, and less drastic means of affecting the freedom
of association would have to be found" [United States v^
aobel 1967]. As a result of this ruling, the courts have
held that public employees, including para-military
employees who have life and death responsibilities [Atkins
V. City of Charlotte 1969] have the constitutional right to
join labor organizations-
An outgrowth of the Robel and Atkins decisions is that
Congress cannot prohibit the freedom of association of
members of the armed forces except to the extent it can
justify such limitations under "judicial precedents." For
this reason, one school of thought contends that any statute
or executive action which prohibited all military personnel
from exercising their right of freedom of association
joining military labor organizations — would be
constitutionally defective. [Webber, C. 1975]
The Army Judge Advocate General in a 1969 Department of
the Army policy letter recognized that membership in labor
organizations was included in the freedom of association
right and available to military personnel. In part, the
letter indicated: "In view of the constitutional right of
freedom of association, it is unlikely that mare membership
in a seviceman's union can constitutionally be
prohibited. . . ." [Mossberg 1975]
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Another school of thought contends that the separate
society doctrine prevents the application of decisions from
cases involving the rights of civilian government employees,
such as the Robel case, to the question of the rights of
military personnel [Thurmond 1977]. This doctrine resulted
from a 1955 Supreme Court case involving a former serviceman
who was arrested by military authorities on a charge of
murder committed in Korea, while on active duty. In this
case the Court observed:
This Court has long recognized that the military is^ by
necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian
society. We have also recognized that the military has,
again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its
own during its long history. The differences between
military and civilian communities result from the fact
th.at "it is the primary business of armies and navies to
fight wars should the occasion arise." r United States Ex
Eel To t h v^ ^uar les 1955] ~
For many years the Supreme Court has avoided ruling on
the First Amendment rights of service personnel by deferring
to Congress's constitutional authority to regulate the
military [Taylor, W. April 1977]. This has been because the
Constitution entrusts to Congress and the President the
responsibility of running the armed forces. Therefore, the
Court has been hesitant to interfere unless clearly defined
judicial matters are involved [ AOSA 30 December 1976]. This
has made it difficult to fully evaluate the Court's stand on
the rights of service personnel.
Although not easily evaluated, opinions of the Supreme
Court in several relevant cases provide the essence of its
position regarding the rights of service members. For
example, in a 1953 case involving a drafted doctor who had
refused to complete required forms and was then denied a
commission, the Court stated:
, judges are not given the task of running the Army.
The responsibility for setting up channels through which .
. grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests
upon the Congress and upon the President of the United
States and his subordinates. [Orloff v_j_ Hillouqhb_^ 1953]
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Then, in a 197U case involving an Army doctor who
refused to train Special Forces medics and made public
statements urging black enlisted personnel not to go to
Vietnam, the Supreme Court indicated:
While the members of the military are not excluded from
the protections granted by the First Amendment, the
different - character of the military community and of the
military mission requires a different application of such
protections; the fundamental necessity for obedience, and
t-he consequent necessity for the imposition of discipline.
may render permissible within the military that which
would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.
[Parker v. Lev^ 1974]
ftiore recently, in a 1976 case involving candidates for
national political office who had been denied permission to
enter a military reservation for the purposes of
campaigning, the Court further defined its approach to the
rights of service personnel:
A military organization is not constructed along
democratic lines and military activities cannot be
governed by democratic procedures. Military institutions
are necessarily far more authoritarian; military decisions
cannot be made by vote of the interested participants.
[T]he existence of the two systems [military and
civilian] [does not] mean that constitutional safeguards,
including the First Amendment, have no application at all
within the military sphere. It only means that the rules
must be somewhat different. [Greer v^ S£Ock 1976]
While the Supreme Court has expressed these and other
Opinions which are relevant, it has not, in the past, seen
fit to interfere where military courts have had jurisdiction
through the authority granted by Congress. Instead, it has
left the military courts to safeguard the rights of service
personnel [Taylor, W. April 1977].
In summary, it is noted that service personnel have
First Amendment rights as do other citizens of the nation.
However, due to a recognized legitimate necessity these
rights are restricted. Since this is the case, one must ask
to what extent can Congress restrict the rights of service
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members in upholding what it sees as its constitutional
responsibilities? And, how far can Congress go in limiting
military collective action groups?
Congress is, of course, constrained by the Constitution
from an over-zealous abrogation of the rights of service
members under the First Amendment. Undoubtedly, the Supreme
Court would strike down a broad constitutional decree
prohibiting fundamental rights. Still the question remains:
How restrictive would Congress have to be before the Supreme
Court would step in and rule legislation unconstitutional?
The answer is uncertain. However, in this regard, it is
important to remember: the concepts of military necessity
and separate society; the Court's reluctance to enter the
realm of authority and rights in the military; and, the
essence of the Court' s position regarding rights of service
personnel.
Cuj;rently, a bill is pending in Congress which would
appear to overly infringe on the right to freedom of
association of military personnel. If this bill eventually
becomes law, it is highly possible that the Supreme Court
will eventually be forced to define, to a greater extent,
the limits of service members' rights under the First
Amendment. This proposed statute is discussed in greater
detail in the next section of this chapter.
B. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS
Numerous restrictions on First Amendment rights of
military personnel limit their ability to take collective
action. Also, legal barriers to collective action groups
having an interest in military personnel exist. These
restrictions and legal barriers are in the form of: laws
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passed by Congress and approved by the President; a
regulations issued by the President or for the President ^^
the Secretary of Defense.
Article 2, Section 2, of the Constitution establishes
the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
as such, the President is entitled to establish regulations
which govern the armed forces. Normally, the President
relies on his principle assistant, the Secretary of Defense,
"in all matters relating to the Department of Defense" [U.S.
Code 1971], to implement such regulations. In at least one
case, however, the President has acted directly. In this
action he excluded "national security organizations" from
coverage under his regulations which allow other employees
of the executive branch of the Federal Government to form,
join, and assist collective action groups which have the
power to collectively bargain with the Government [U.S.
Federal Labor Relations Council 1975].
Congress derives its authority over the military from
article I, Section 8, of the Constitution which indicates
that it shall have the power: (1) to provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States; (2) raise
and support armies; and, (3) to provide and maintain a navy.
Furthermore, Congress is also empowered to make rules for
the Government and to regulate the land and naval forces.
On 16 September 1977, in what it viewed as a valid
exercise of this authority, the Senate approved and sent to
the House of Representatives a bill (S. 274) which would
limit collective action by prohibiting "labor unions in the
U.S. military services" F Monterey Peninsula Herald 17
September 1977]. However, the Department of Defense has
previously gone on record as opposing such legislation.
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In this regard. Secretary of Defense Brown told the
Senate Armed Services Committee that, "caution should be
exercised in any legislative action in this area." He
believes that existing regulations are sufficient and that
drastic statutes which would outlaw the union form of
collective action might do more harm than good. In
addition. Brown told the committee that any legislation
would have to be examined carefully to insure that
constitutional protections of free speech and association
are not violated. He is of the opinion that, "adverse court
decisions could lead to greater limitations on the armed
forces* ability to deal with these matters than exist now."
fNavy Times 4 April 19 77]
The Senate's proposed statute uses the term "labor
organization" extensively and defines it as a group that:
seeks to negotiate with the Government concerning terms and
conditions of military service; represents service members
in grievance proceedings; or, strikes, pickets, or engages
in any other concerted action against the Government.
The proposed law contains three significant sections.
The first deals with military personnel and would make it
unlawful for them to: knowingly become a member of or
solicit others to join a labor organization; bargain on
military issues with or on behalf of a labor organization
claiming to i^epresent other military personnel; participate
in or organize a strike, picket, or similar activity against
the Government; or, use or permit the use of military
property for a meeting which concerns activities prohibited
by the bill.
A second section would make it illegal for a labor
organization to: enroll, solicit, or accept dues or fees
from military personnel; bargain on military issues with the
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Government on behalf of military personnel; represent
military personnel in grievance proceedings; organiae or
participate in a strike or other concerted action by
military personnel against the Government; or, use any
military property for a meeting which concerns activities
prohibited by the proposed statute.
The third key section would specifically exclude from
its restrictive provisions existing military and veteran
associations. This is of course provided that they do not
support any of the prohibitions of the bill. [Thurmond
August 1977]
Regardless of whether the Senate bill just outlined
becomes law, there are, currently, many statutory provisions
in existence which restrict the ability of service personnel
to take collective action. For example, the Uniform Code of
Military Justice includes many articles which could be
applied against individuals who went too far in their
collective job-related actions to affect military
conditions. These articles provide criminal penalties for:
soliciting or advising another to desert, mutiny, misbehave
before the enemy, or commit sedition (Art. 82) ; deserting or
being absent without leave (Art. 85 and 86) ; missing
movement (Art. 87) ; using contemptuous words by commissioned
officers against certain officials (Art. 88) ; disrespect
toward a commissioned officer (Art. 89); willfully
disobeying a superior commissioned officer (Art. 90)
;
insubordinate conduct toward a warrant officer,
noncommissioned officer, or petty officer (Art. 91)
disobeying an order or regulation (Art. 92) ; mutiny or
sedition (Art. 94) ; damaging or destroying military or other
property of the United States (Art. 108 and 109);
malingering (Art. 115) ; riots or breach of the peace (Art.
116); provoking speech or gestures (Art. 117); assault (Art.
128) ; and, conduct to the prejudice of good order and
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military discipline (Art. 134). [U.S. Code 1971 and
Department of Defense 1977]
Under existing statutes, a collective action group and
its leadership could conceivably be charged with criminal
offenses while assisting military personnel in collective
job-related actions (marches, pickets, strikes, etc.) of the
type prohibited in the Senate's proposed law (S. 274) and in
an existing Department of Defense directive (this directive
will be outlined later in this chapter) . Any support of
these activities could be interpreted as violating statutes
which prohibit the following acts: (1) enticing desertion;
(2) entering government property for any purpose prohibited
by law or regulation; (3) striking against the government;
(4) counseling or distributing written materials advising a
service member to insubordination; and, (5) counseling a
serviceman to mutiny, disloyalty, insubordination, or a
refusal of duty [U.S. Code 1971].
By law, the Secretary of Defense is granted "authority,
direction, and control over the Department of Defense" [U.S.
Code 197 1]. Under this authority he has recently published
a directive which spells out the Department of Defense's
policy on collective action and lists prohibited collective
activities and permissible individual activities. The
policy section of the directive indicates:
The mission of the Department of Defense is to
safeguard the security of the United States. Discipline,
obedience to lawful orders and loyalty on the part of
members of the Armed Forces are essential to the combat
readiness required to accomplish this mission. The
interposition of collective or concerted action by any
organization in the command relationships established by
law and regulation for the government of the Armed Forces
would
:
1. Erode the discipline of the Armed Forces;
2. Interfere with the power of the Congress tc make
rules for the government and regulation of the land,
air and naval forces, and interfere with the




3. Impair the authority of the President as Command
in Chief of the Armed Forces and that of office
appointed by him to command the Armed Forces; and,
4. Impair the reliability- operational readiness and
combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces so as to
threaten the security of the United States.
[Department of Defense 1977, p. 2]
The directive contains several key provisions which
restrict collective action within the military
establishment. First, it precludes commanding officers or
"superiors" from engaging in negotiations or collective
bargaining about military conditions. Second, the directive
does not allow members of the armed forces tc engage in a
strike, work stoppage, or any similar collective job-related
action directed at military conditions. Third, the
regulation precludes persons from conducting a
demonstration, march, protest, or other similar activity on
any part of a military installation for the purpose of
forming, recruiting members, or soliciting money or services
for an "organization."
An "organization" is defined as any group that: engages
in any activity prohibited by the regulation; engages in
negotiations or collective bargaining on behalf of members
of the armed forces; represents members of the armed forces
to the military chain of command with respect to terms or
conditions of military service when such representation
would interfere with the military chain of command; or,
solicits or aids and abets a violation of the directive by a
member of the armed forces. Furthermore, no member of the
armed forces can become or remain an active member of any
group when: a determination has been made by the Department
of Defense that the group presents a clear danger to the
discipline, loyalty, or obedience to lawful orders because
the group engages in any act prohibited by the directive;
or, violates, solicits, or aids and aoets a violation of a
specific article of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice.
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A fourth provision of the directive disallows members of
the armed forces from engaging in any of the prohibitions of
the directive or asking for or helping anyone else to do so.
Finally, even though the directive treats prohibitions at
length, it also deals with permissible individual activities
in which military personnel can engage. These activities
include: belonging to labor organizations in connection
with off-duty employment; presenting views to one's
commanding officer; presenting a complaint through
established channels; petitioning Congress; or, being
represented by counsel in certain formal proceedings.
[Department of Defense 1977]
In brief , it can be said that many laws and regulations
exist to restrict not only the ability of service personnel
to take collective action but also the ability of groups
formed for this purpose. In order for members of the armed
forces to attain a less restrictive form of collective
action, it would be necessary for an individual,
individuals, or a collective action group to successfully
challenge existing laws and regulations through the court
system to, and including, the Supreme Court. However, tae
fact that restrictions exist does not mean that service
people can neither take collective action ncr join groups
that would assist them in achieving a collective voice at
the present time. On the contrary, they can. In fact, both
Congress and the Department of Defense look with favor upon
one form of collective action group — military association.





The second chapter of this thesis described the
conditions which are providing the stimulus for military
personnel to take collective action and to form groups for
this purpose. This chapter will discuss military
associations, one of the two basic forms of collective
action groups into which this stimulus could be channeled.
Since the early 1920's, military associations have been
by far the dominant form of collective action groups
available to cater to the needs of military personnel and to
act as their spokesmen outside the chain-of-command.
However, few people inside the military and fewer still
outside of the military know very much about military
associations. Little is known of their power or
effectiveness, who they are, what they have done for
military personnel and what they plan to do for them in the
future, or how they compare to military unions. This
chapter will attempt to correct this situation by: (1)
distilling from the multitude of military-oriented groups,
not all of which are collective action groups, a list of
military associations which appear to be capable of
effectively challenging the appeal of military unions; (2)
explaining how these military associations operate and
summarizing what they have done and are doing for military
personnel; (3) revealing what military associations and
other military-oriented groups are doing to improve their
effectiveness; and, (4) describing the strengths and




The Ency^clopedia of Associations contains the names of
over too military-oriented groups. However, the vast
majority are veteran or special-interest groups with no
direct connection with active duty members of the armed
forces r Encyclopedia of Assoc iations 1977]. In fact, only a
handful of easily identifiable national associations are
equipped and have the requisite goals and objectives which
allows them to fit the definition of a military association
established earlier. This definition indicated that a
military association is a formal collective action group
open to military personnel of the regular armed forces which
has at least one registered congressional lobbyist and which
maintains close liaison with the military services; it uses,
as necessary, lobbying, member letter- writing campaigns, and
its ties with the military services to achieve its primary
and secondary objectives -- improving the "people programs"
of the armed forces and aiding the services in fulfilling
their hardware needs. The discussion of military
associations in this chapter will be limited to only those
military-oriented groups which have been found to fit the
parameters of this definition.
The author's research has shown that only six of the
many military-oriented groups come within these parameters.
There are, of course, many other military-oriented
organizations which have been and are doing a creditable job
of supporting many of the "people programs" of the defense
establishment. Veterans organizations such as the American
Legion — with 2.8 million members and one of the most
powerful lobbies in Congress — have repeatedly supported
the current method of operating commissary stores f Na vy
Times September 1975]. Professional military societies,
which do not lobby, such as the Air Perce Association
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(150,000 members) and the Association of the United States
Army (97,000 members) have taken with increasing regularity
strong positions supporting institutional benefits and a
"serviceman's bill of rights." Many of the military
societies are frequently invited to present the views of
their members to the Department of Defense and before
congressional committees and to recommend solutions to
existing problems. However, veteran organizations and
professional military societies are not of primary interest.
to this study since their method of problem solving, main
objectives, and fundamental goals are not the same as those
of military associations.
B. SIX MILITAfiY ASSOCIATIONS
The six military associations have the same goal — a
strong military, manned by well-trainad, adequately
compensated members. They provide a means for members of
the armed forces to take collective action for three
purposes: (1) to uphold the security of the nation by
supporting national defense needs; (2) to aid in the
development and support passage of legislation designed to
maintain the attractiveness of military careers; and, (3) to
protect the rights of the uniformed services community at
the national level through their influence with Congress and
the Department of Defense [NAUS 1977]. All six associations
are open to active duty military personnel and career
retirees.
Each of the six associations maintains liaison with the
military departments. Through this effort the association
gains more information sooner than would otherwise be
possible; spots potentially serious problems which it can
help solve; a-nd, develops a close rapport with the services.
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Even though a close relationship exists, from time to time
the six oppose Department of Defense policies which they do
not feel are advantageous to military personnel or in the
best interests of the services. Howevever, they rarely
oppose the goals of the service chiefs. [ NAUS 1977]. Also,
each association has a legislative staff with at least one
registered lobbyist which concentrates on personnel matters,
as would a military union. In addition, these associations
enjoy credibility with Congress and are seen as trying to
tell both sides of the Department of Defense story. In
short, they operate within the system and support the
services as well as their members. [Strickland 1976]
All of the military associations do an outstanding job
of keeping their members fully informed through a variety of
information services. These services can be categorized
into three types: (1) periodic publications, (2) special
bulletins, and (3) personal assistance.
Periodic publications provide the member with timely and
factual information on a monthly or bi-monthly basis. The
periodicals contain articles describing: pending
legislation and new laws, including specific standings of
congessmen and senators, that effect the member and his
family; the availability of health and dental care services;
issues affecting entitlements of active duty personnel, such
as pay raises and changes to the pay system; veteran,
retiree, and survivor benefits; and, legislative procedures
which tell the member how laws are made and hew to
communicate effectively with members of Congress to get
"action." Special bulletins are published as the need
arises and inform the member of the status of important
legislation. The bulletins also tell what specific action
the member should take to insure that favorable bills are
passed and unfavorable bills defeated. Personal assistance
is a counselling service on matters affecting benefits, pay.
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survivor benefits, annuities, insurance, availability of
medical care through military installations, CHAMPUS, and
Medicare.
Even though there are numerous similarities among the
six military associations, there is one significant
difference. Each, except for the National Association for
Uniformed Services, has in the past restricted its
membership to either commissioned officers or
non-commissioned officers of the armed forces population
rather than accepting all who are interested in joining.
Recently, however, in an apparent attempt to counter the
appeal of military unions, several noncommissioned officer
associations have expanded their membership to include not
only pay grades E4 through E9 but also El through E3.
Others which had been limited to retired or reserve military
personnel have expanded their membership into the active
duty community. In order to give an overview of how the six
associations operate and to summarize what they have done
and are doing for military personnel, each military
association will be discussed individually in the following
paragraphs.
I • hlL .^orce Sergeants Association i,AFS A]_
AFSA was founded in 1961 and is the most aggressive
and fastest growing of the group. In the past two years
alone its menibership has increased 70 percent (34,000).
Current membership, which is limited to enlisted Air Force
members — active. National Guard, reserve, and retired
stands at 83,000.
AFSA has been highly innovative in a number of ways.
First, it is the only one of the six that has national
toil-free lines at its headquarters in Washington, D. C. to
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encourage a free flow of information and ideas from its
members in the field. Second, on a trial basis in Alabama
and California, it is establishing state level lobbying
efforts. AFSA is doing this through chapter chairmen in
these states with supervision and guidance from its national
headguarters. To assist in this effort, AFSA has published
two comprehensive guides, one tailored to California and the
other to Alabama, which provide a resume of largely unknown
state laws granting a multitude of rights, benefits, and
privileges to gualifying members of the association. The
guides also contain general guidelines on state legislative
procedures, the "art of lobbying," and guidelines for
lobbyists. Third, AFSA represents individual members before
Government agencies (i.e.. Veteran's Administration, Civil
Service Commission, and various elements of the DoD
bureaucracy) when it feels there is a clear indication of
injustice, cr lack of full consideration of factors bearing
upon the case [Harlow 1977].
2 • lies t Reserve Asso ciation (FRA)
The Association was established in 1924 and is
highly respected by both Congress and the Department of
Defense. It is probably the most effective of the six
associations. Current membership is 133,000 and is
restricted to enlisted personnel of the Navy, Marine Corps,
Coasz Guard, Navy and ' Marine Fleet Reserve, and retired
enlisted members of these services. FRA has been the leader
among the associations in their campaign against military
unions and has spent heavily to oppose military unionism.
In an effort to get first-hand information from
active duty personnel of all services on how they feel about
military compensation, retirement, and unionization, FRA
recently established the "Sound-off to Congress" program.
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Information for the program is obtained from public hearings
held by the "White Hat" Pay Panel at various locations
across the nation. During these hearings military personnel
are invited to appear and testify as to their views on these
subjects. The findings of the first series of Pay Panel
hearings were presented to the Senate - Armed Services
Committee on 19 July 1977 [Nolan 1977]. This program has
been highly successful and both Congress and the Department
of Defense have expressed great interest. In fact, both are
so interested that hearings held during November 1977 had a
panel which included congressmen and high ranking military
officers.
3. National Association for Uniformed Services (NAUS)
NAUS was organized in 1968 and' is the only
association open to both officers and enlisted personnel and
all branches of the armed forces. Its membership parameters
are so broadly based because its founders were convinced
from their experiences in both active duty and retirement
that dealing with Congress and the Administration would be
more effective if NAUS included all elements of the military
community as members [NAUS 1977]. Currently, membership
stands at 25,000. Although it has the broadest base from
which to draw its members, the appeal of this feature, as
evidenced by its relatively small membership, has not been
widespread.
Despite its size, NAUS appears to be effective. For
instance, a NAUS representative claims that in 1974 it not
only generated the legislation to improve the armed forces'
Survivor Benefit Plan but was also instrumental in passage
of this bill. Currently, it is attempting to improve the
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overall effectiveness of military associations through its
efforts to make the Ad Hoc Committee, which will be
discussed later, more of a uniting force. [Sheffey 1977]
^ • Non-Co mmis signed Officers Association (NCOA)
The Association was founded in 1960 and is the only
one of the six military associations not headquartered in
the Washington, D. C. area. It does, however, maintain a
fully staffed "National Capital Office". It is open to
noncommissioned officers and petty officers, E4 through E9,
of all branches of the armed forces — active. National
Guard, reserve, and retired. Membership stands at 150,000.
Unlike the other military associations, NCOA is not
totally dependent on individual members, local chapters, and
direct mail recruiting programs to attract new members. At
most major military installations NCOA has full or part-time
Resident Counsellors who are licensed life insurance agents.
Counsellors have several functions which include: (1)
explaining to potential new members the benefits of joining;
(2) assisting widows of members in applying for survivor
benefits; and, (3) selling NCOA endorsed life insurance.
According to an NCOA spokesman, the Resident Counsellor
program has been highly successful. The Association
believes the program's main advantage is that members can be
"assured that their wives will be taken care of" if
something should happen to them. For many members who have
foreign born wives who do not speak English well, this
program helps alleviate a major concern.
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5. Reserve Officers Association (ROA)
SOA was established in 1922 and has a long record of
successful lobbying efforts dating back over forty years.
Today, its name is a misnomer because its membership is no
longer restricted to reserve officers. Currently, tne
Association has a membership of 102,000 and is restricted to
commissioned and warrant officers, regular and reserve, of
the armed forces who are on active duty or are retired.
Over the years ROA's support for active duty
personnel includes the following:
* 1934 - lobbied for and is credited with obtaining an
extra $28 million in military expenditures to allow
more training for armed forces personnel
* 1948 - supported PL 80-810 which provided retirement
pay for all career officers and the opportunity for
the first time for regular officers of the Army and
Air Force to retire with less than 30 years service
* 1956 ^ supported legislation which brought the
survivors of regular military personnel under the
Dependency and Indemnity Compensation Act
* 1963 - credited with leading the fight which resulted
in a recompu tation of retirement pay
* 1964 - credited with obtaining enactment of a law
which provides four-year ROTC scholarship programs for
all services
* 1969 - supported legislation to increase per diem and




* 1970 - supported a Servicemen's Group Life Insurance
(SGtl) increase to $15,000
* 1972 " backed enactment of the Survivor Benefit Plan
* 1974 - supported an SGLI increase to $20,000 [Ganas
1976]
More recently, in a class action suit brought by the
Promotion Research Committee, ROA testified as a witness in
behalf of those active duty officers who failed selection by
"improperly constituted" selection boards. While the
Association has been involved with class action suits of the
type just described, it has not gotten involved in
individual court cases. This is because ROA does not have
the legal staff that such an endeavor would involve.
However, the Association does advise and council its
members, informally, on an individual basis. [Ganas 1976
and 1977 ]
6. The Retired Officers Association JTROAJ^
The Association was founded in 1929 and is the
largest of the six associations. Like ROA, its name is also
a misnomer. This is because it now accepts active duty
officers as well as retired; currently, membership stands at
230,000. IROA was one of the first associations to
recognize the need for an umbrella group and was
instrumental in forming both the Council of Military
Organizations and the Ad Hoc Committee. These umbrella
groups will be discussed further in a later section.
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Like the other five, TRO& establishes many of its
goals and policies for the coming year at its annual
convention. At the 1976 convention, TROA approved
resolutions, designed to improve the economic standing of
their members, which addressed the following issues:
protection of entitlements; equalization of retired pay;
improvements to survivor protection plans; health care;
federal income tax reform; employee restrictions (changing
the restrictions covered in the Dual Compensation Act of
196U) ; and, longevity, retired pay, and VA disability
compensation. [Air Force Times 4 October 1976]. It should
be noted that despite the fact that over three-quarters of
IBOA's members are retired officers, three of the seven
resolutions are directly concerned with improving overall
compensation of active duty personnel.
7« Future Efforts
Military associations generally have been able to
agree on a number of military benefits and entitlements that
they will attempt to protect or improve in the future. This
includes opposition to the following actions which would
erode benefits: taxation of active duty allowances;
taxation of commissary and exchange sales; initiation of
contributory retirement plan and/or phase-out of early
retirement; deferral of retirement pay to age 60 of
voluntary retirees; reduction or denial of retired pay to
military retirees in the civil service; reduction of
retirement pay by some portion cf subsequent earnings in any
type of employment; further reduction of the CHAHPUS
program; reduction or termination of social security
payments to military retirees; and, change in the subsidized
commissary system. Also included is support for the
following legislation: recomputation cf retired pay;
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severance pay for enlisted personnel who are involuntarily
separated before completion of 20 years service; improved
survivor benefits; and, a provision which would entitle
dependents of active and retired military personnel to
receive dental care under CHAMPUS.
C. ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS
If the six military associations discussed above were
merged into one large association or were unified under an
umbrella organization similar to the AFL-CIO, the result
would be a powerful lobbying organization backed by nearly
three-quarters of a million members. This organization
would have more power collectively than could be obtained by
simply summing its parts. Even though two weak umbrella
groups, the Council of Military Organizations and the Ad Hoc
Committee, have been formed in an effort to point all
military associations and military-oriented groups in the
same direction, only NAOS believes that it would be
desirable or feasible for military associations to merge or
submit to a unifying force. The other five are concerned
not only with broad issues which effect members of all six
military associations, but also issues which are peculiar to
their restricted memberships as well. For example, AFSA is
currently attempting to have regulations changed so that
enlisted personnel who undertake the two years of required
schooling for the Air Force Physician's Assistant Specialty
are promoted to Warrant Officer upon completion. On the
AFSA's list of pending proposals, this issue ranks seventh
Qur of 13. Obviously, if the six associations were to




According to the Executive Vice President of NAUS, John
Sheffey, the reason why merger or unification is not
considered desirable or feasible is that each is "jealous of
its own turf." In addition, he believes that the enlisted
associations are fearful of domination by the officer
associations and each is "determined to have independence."
[Sheffey 1977]
In addition to NAUS, at least one other of the six
military associations has considered a combined commissioned
officer and enlisted association. In 1967, TROA conducted a
study to determine the desirability of opening its
membership tc enlisted noncommissioned officers. In an
opinion poll, 80 percent of the members questioned opposed
such a move, 15 percent favored it, and five percent had no
opinion. Naturally, the noncommissioned officer
associations took a dim view of TROA's proposed action. A
representative of one stated:
The very composition of our association makes it
impractical for us to merge into a theoretical,
all-powerful lobby group. No matter which way you slice
it, we are different groups, with different backgrounds
and, at times, different problems. [Lein 1975, p. 23, 24]
A key point made by the TROA study group was the need
and desire for a greater exchange of ideas between military
associations and other military-oriented groups. From this
came the Council of Military Organizations (COMO), an
umbrella group of 12 military-oriented organizations and
military associations which meets at least monthly to
discuss personnel-related matters affecting all segments of
the armed forces.
However, COMO has a major weakness. it is unable to
provide strong centralized direction or require unified
action because it is fundamental to the council that each
association retains its own individual identity. Despite
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its major weakness, C3M0 members are able to reach, with
increasing frequency, a consensus on matters of common
interest [ Lein 1975]. Since it was established, COMO's
membership has been restricted to the following
organizations:
Air Force Association
Air Force Sergeants Association
U. S. Coast Guard CEO Association




Naval Enlisted Reserve Association
Naval Reserve Association
Reserve Officers Association
The Retired Officers Association
U. S. Army Warrant Officers Association [ AFSA 1977]
In 1970, another umbrella group with a broader power
base was formed. The group was called the Ad Hoc Committee
and initially had 14 member organizations. The objective of
the Committee is to exchange views on defense policies,
"people programs," and hardware needs of the services.
Through its monthly meetings, like COMO, the Ad Hoc
Committee provides for the free flow of information among
its members and an insight into how legislation and various
policies impact on the total military establishment [ Lein
1975]. Unfortunately, the Committee suffers from the same
major weakness that effects COMO — it is unable to provide
strong centralized direction. Currently, the Committee is
made up of 22 military-oriented organizations and military
associations, six of which are also members of COMO. A list
of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee is provided below:
Air Force Association






Association of the United States Army
Disabled Officers Association
Marine Corps League
Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association
Military Order of World Wars






U. S, Army Warrant Officers Association
Veterans of Foreign Wars [ AFSA 1977]
According to Mr.. Sheffey, both COMO and the Ad Hoc
Committee members may collectively agree on a joint position
regarding a particular piece of proposed legislation but do
not submit to direction or control. As a result, there is
no unified strategy on how to persuade Congress. This
shortcoming can result in "all members calling on one
senator while not on another." Despite their shortcomings,
both COMO and the Ad Hoc Committee are a significant step in
the right direction and they are a major improvement over
the uncoordinated approach to issues which existed prior to
their formation. [Sheffey 1977]
D. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF MILITARY ASSOCIATIONS
The military associations and the service-oriented press
do not believe there is anything that a military union could
do that is not being done by military associations already,
unless it is to generate some degree of fear within the
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leadership of the armed forces of a possible strike threat.
[Air Force Tim es July 1975]. This view is also held by
James Peirce, President of the National Federation of
Federal Employees. In response to a letter written by the
author of this thesis, Mr. Peirce stated:
lou raised the issue concerning unions vers'us
associations; you should realize that associations lobby
very vigorously on Capital Hill to attain benefits for
r_their ] members. This is a primary purpose of a union.
The associations are, in effect, performing in much the
same manner as a union. Note, for instance, the lobby
efforts of the Air Force Association, the [Reserve]
Officers Association, the [Air Force] Sergeants
Association, etc. ; these organizations spend untold
dollars on lobbying for benefits for their members.
Difference — there is no real difference, just semantics.
[Peirce, 1977]
Many comparisons have been drawn between some of the
more aggressive military associations and unions. Even
though many points of comparison exist, there are two very
important and significant differences. First, military
associations do not employ collective bargaining as a means
of reaching their objectives. Second, they do not condone
the utilization of any form of strike to achieve their
goals. [Harlow 1977]
Military associations support not only their members but
the services as well. Th
_
operate within the system and
have been credited wit? many successes. These successes
include: recomputation of retirement pay; SGLI increases to
$15,000 and $20,000; the original and subsequent
improvements to the armed forces' Survivor Benefit Plan;
and, retention of the subsidized commissary system.
Military associations have performed and continue to perform
a number of important functions which are listed below:
1. Provide another line of communications for the




2. Provide an alternative line of communication for their
members to express their views and needs to the
services
3. Provide support to the services in communicating
policy and hardware needs to the American public
4. Provide support in the Congress for Department of
Defense sponsored legislation which in their view is
beneficial to service members
5. Provide support, through local units, for military
community relations programs
6. Provide, through their efforts to enhance the public
image of the military, support for service recruiting
programs
7. Provide, at group rates and specifically tailored for
their membership, benefits — group health and life
insurance, travel, and discount plans — not available
from the military services [Lien 1975]
There are several reasons why military associations have
not been more effective in the past. First, the Department
of Defense has been reluctant to accept their criticism as
well as their support and has failed to take full advantage
of the opportunity to comttiunicate with service personnel
through their military associations [Air Force Times July
1975]. This problem persists even today but is beginning to
be countered by programs such as FHA's "Sound-off to
Congress". Second, service personnel have not given wide
support to military associations. Now, however, membership
is increasing rapidly and members are becoming more active
and vocal [Strickland 1976]. Each military association is
convinced that it will be able to do a better job with more
members. Third, there has been lack of unanimity among
military associations with similar objectives [ Lein 1975].
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This problem has been so obvious that even Congress has
criticized military associations for this shortcoming.
Today, however, this problem has been somewhat diminished by




The second and fourth chapters of this thesis described
the conditions which are providing the stimulus for military
personnel to take collective action and one of the two basic
forms of collective action groups into which this stimulus
could be channeled. This chapter continues this discussion
by describing the second of the two basic forms of
collective action groups — military unions.
Included in this chapter is a discussion of possible
military union sources, the limits of military union power
today, and the limits to which it could possibly expand in
the future. Also, the chapter attempts to assess the
possibility of military unions coming into existence in this
country by examining the views of the general public,
military personnel, and the leadership of the armed forces
concerning the unionization issue.
A. BACKGROUND
Today, there are no military unions of consequence in
the United States. For this reason, it is necessary to look
elsewhere to gain an understanding of how military unions
might develop and what capabilities and power they would
probably possess if widespread military unionization occurs
in this country.
It appears that there are three likely sources from
which military unions might develop:
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1. The more aggressive military associations may modify
their ty-laws to allow collective bargaining
2. Existing organizations which call themselves military
unions may gain greater support and strength
3. Existing public and private sector unions may expand
their membership base to include military personnel
Because a detailed discussion of military associations
has already been conducted (see Chapter IV) and because
these associations, have shown little inclination towards
wanting collective bargaining rights, this chapter will not
include a discussion of the first of the three sources
listed above. In addition, the discussion of the third
source will be limited to Federal sector unions which have
previously expressed interest in the unionization of the
military. State, county, and local public sector unions and
private sector unions will not be brought into the
discussion because they are for the most part strongly
opposed to unionizing the military and are therefore not
viewed as a likely source.
Many previous authors have examined Federal sector
unions and Western European military unions in an attempt to
determine what United States military unions would be like
if they came into existence. This discussion will
additionally guestion the validity of using Western European
military unions as a model in its critical examination of
the comparability of the European experience to the




Since World War II there have been a number of
unsuccessful grass-roots, in-house attempts to organize
members of the armed forces. The first of these and the
largest occurred early in 1946 when large numbers of service
personnel in Germany and the Philippines protested the slow
pace of demobilization. The group in Manila claimed to
represent 139,000 soldiers. since the issue was temporary
in nature, the union disappeared shortly after
demobilization. [Towell 1976]
The next attempt, apparently, did not occur until the
Vietnam War. This attempt began on 25 December 1967 when a
group known as the American Servicemen's Union (ASU) was
formed. Its founder, Andrew Stepp, was an avowed
Marxist-Leninist who had joined the Army to organize it from
within. [Karris 1975]. Shortly afterward, Stepp published
a list of "progressive" demands which included:
1. The right to refuse illegal and immoral orders
2. Election of military officers
3. Trial by a jury of peers
4. Abolution of the salute and term "sir"
5. The right to collective bargaining
6. The right of free political association
7. The Federal minimum wage for all enlisted personnel
8. The right of Black, Latin, and other national minority
service personnel to "determine their own lives free
from oppression of racist whites" [Pruden 1976]
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In 1969, at its zenith, ASU reached a total membership
of 5,000 to 6,500 [Time 1969]. However, with the phasing
out of the Vietnam War and the termination of the draft, the
union lost mcst of its support [Harris 1975], Many previous
authors on the subject of military unionization have
indicated that ASD is now practically non-existent. This
may be true but ASU claims its current membership stands at
11,000 r EncYclgpegi^ of Association^ 1977].
ASU's attempt to unionize the armed forces in the late
1960's and early 1970's encountered difficulties from: (1)
the military establishment's ability to "harass
troublemakers" in countless ways, including transfers to
remote locations or to combat in Vietnam; (2) the military
establishment's ability to court-martial service personnel
for "catch-all crimes" such as conduct which is prejudical
to good order and discipline; (3) regulations which
precluded local commanders from recognizing the existence of
"so-called 'serviceman's unions'" but which permitted them,
within reason, to place "off-limits" to service personnel
establishments used as meeting places [Department of Defense
1969]; (4) lack of support by organized labor [Hefti 1977];
and, (5) lack of support by Black activists, which had been
counted upon from the union's inception. [Harris 1975]
In addition to ASU, the Vietnam War spawned several
other small and ineffective grass-rcots, in-house
unionization efforts. These included the Federation of
Commissioned Uniformed Officers (FOCUS) , Vietnam Veterans
Against the War, Winter Soldiers Organization, The Defense
Committee [Hefti 1977], and the Concerned Officers Movement
(COM) [Pruden 1976]. After the war, the Union of U. S.
Military Physicans (UUSMP) was formed in 1975 and grew to
approximately 300 members [ Army Time s 28 May 1975 and Air
Force Times 16 July 1975]. Today, two new groups, the
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Enlisted Peoples Organizing Committee (EPOC) and the Citizen
Soldier, are attempting to succeed ' Mhare previous
unionization efforts of this type have failed f Navy. Times 6
June 1977 and Deline 1977].
All grass-root, in-house unionization efforts, to date,
generally have several things in common which cause the
Department of Defense to treat them with little concern and
to view them as only a minor annoyance. First, they are,
for the most part, uncoordinated attempts on a part-time
basis by disgruntled first-term personnel who have little or
no expertise in either organizing a union or in military and
labor law. Second, these unions frequently address
themselves to issues that are not broadly based or are
perceived as being radical. As a result, these unions have
difficulty attracting the average service member. Third,
they are poorly financed and this severely limits their
growth potential. As a result of these three factors,
unionization efforts of this hue stand only a very small
chance of ever succeeding.
C. FEDERAL SECTOR CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE UNIONS
The most likely source from which military unions could
develop is the Federal sector civilian employee unions.
Military unionization appears to be the next logical step
for Federal employee unions to take in their long . and slow
development — development which has been due to the gradual
liberalization of labor-management relations policies in the
Federal Government. This section will trace the historical
growth of Federal employee unions and speculate on their
future growth. In addition, this section will point out the
logical limits of authority which military unions could
expect to confront in labor-management relations with the
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Federal Government even if current policies and laws are
liberalized — limits which would be set by policies and
laws determining the scope of civilian Federal employee
labor-management relations.
1 . Growth of P2wer and Size
Union activity of civilian employees in the Federal
sector is not a recent development. In fact, organizations
of blue-collar workers in the Government date back to the
1830 's. However, it was not until the passage of the
Lloyd-LaFollete Act in 1912 that Federal civilian employees
gained the right to belong to unions, provided that the
union did not assert the right to strike. [Lewis 1965].
Even today, this Act is the only significant Federal statute
protecting this right [Strickland 1976].
The first union open to all Federal employees
regardless of trade or occupation was the National
Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE) . It was formed in
1917 when the American Federation of Labor (AFL) issued a
charter to several directly affiliated local unions.
However, a 1932 disagreement with the AFL over
jurisdictional matters resulted in the withdrawal of the
UFFE from the Federation. Today, it still remains an
active, in'dependent union. Local unions which opposed
secession formed the American Federation of Government
Employees (AFGE) in the same year. [Lewis 1965]
Private sector unions made great advances in the
1930 's with favorable legisla.tion such as the
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act) . Among other things, the
Wagner Acr accorded workers in the private sector the right
to collectively bargain. While these advances were being
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made by private sector employees, public sector employees
were specifically excluded. [A'Hearn 197U]
Even though President Roosevelt was largely
responsible for the revival of unionism in the private
sector during this period, he did not believe that
collective bargaining could be transplanted to the public
sector. In 1937, in a letter to the President of NFFE, he
expressed what became viewed as the Government's policy
(until the 1960's) toward its employees' rights;
. .1. government employees should realize that the process
of collective bargaining, as is usually understood, cannot
be transplanted into public service. it has its distinct
and unsurmountable limitations when applied to public
personnel management. ...
. . . Upon employees in Federal service rests the
obligation to serve the whole people; whose interest and
welfare require orderliness and continuity in the conduct
of Government activities. This obligation is paramount.
Since their own services have to do with the functioning
of the Government, a strike of public employees manifests
nothing less than an intent on their part to prevent or
obstruct the operations of the Government. . . . Such
action, looking toward the paralysis of Government by
those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and
intolerable. ..." [Krendel 1975, p. 23, 2U
]
By 1940, over one-third of all Federal Civil Service
employees had become union members. Even though it was
generally felt that these employees could not or would not
strike, the enlarged scope of union activities and
participation brought more labor legislation from Congress
shortly after World War II ended. [A'Hearn 1974]
In 1947, a general labor law, the Taft-Hartley Act,
which included a specific provision for Federal employees,
was passed. This provision. Section 305, made it unlawful
for any employee of the Government to participate in a
strike. This Section was replaced in 1955 by Public Law 330
which made it a felony for a Federal employee to participate




Labor attempted to counter this move as it had in
the past by going to its friends in Congress for help. This
attempt took the form of the Rhodes-Johnson Union
Recognition Bill. Its goal was to strengthen Federal cublic
sector unions by establishing statutory grievance procedures
and binding arbitration. The Bill never reached the House
floor despite the fact that it was introduced in every
session of Congress from 1949 through 1960. [A'Hearn 1974],
This Bill was important because it set zhe stage for labor
reform in the Kennedy administration.
Knowing labor's support contributed significantly to
his narrow victory, Kennedy set about to repay his debt
shortly after entering office. This resulted in a task
force of rhe most influential memoers in his administration
being formed in 1961. The result was Executive Order 10938
which the President issued on 17 January 1962.
Often referred to as the "Magna Carta" for Federal
employees, the Order established for the first time a
uniform labor relations policy in the Executive Branch of
the Federal Government. The key provisions of the Order
were:
1. The right to organize and present views collectively
to Government officials and Congress
2. The right of an employee organization to informal,
formal, or exclusive recognition
3. The right of formally and exclusively recognized
organizations to be consulted and to raise for joint
discussion matters of concern to their members
4. The right of exclusive representation to negotiate
written agreements [Krendel 1975]
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with the establishment of the Order, one-way
communications between Federal managers and the union came
to an end. The union no longer had to just listen since it
now had legal channels of communication. Now, also,
management was required to negotiate with union
representatives and had to make a good faith attempt at
reaching an agreement. [Strickland 1976]
There can be little doubt that the order was a
significant step in improving government labor-management
relations in the Federal sector. However, various
difficulties in implementation developed. One of the major
difficulties was that no formal policy-making organization
had been established to ensure that the Order was equally
applied throughout the Government. This, as well as other
complaints, led President Johnson to establish a committee
to recommend adjustments to Executive Order 10988 [ Krendel
1975].
The recommendations of this committee were
incorporated into Executive Order 11491 which was issued by
President Nixon on 29 October 1969. The new Order replaced
Kennedy's Order which was revoked at that time. Nixon's
Order was basically a refinement of the old, but, in
addition, it provided for the establishment of (1) the
Federal Labor Relations Council and (2) the Federal Impasses
Panel. These agencies provided greater control over the
administration and interpretation of the Order than had
previously existed. Also, a specific method for the
settlement of unresolved disputes and further definition of
areas which could and could not be covered in the
negotiation of agreements were included in the Order. Of
particular interest are the areas excluded from negotiation.
The Order indicates:
. The obligation to meet and confer does not include
matters with respect to mission of an agency; its budget;
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its organization; the number of employees; and the number,
types, and grades of positions of employees assigned to an
orqanxzational unit. ... [U. S. federal Labor Relations
Council 1975, p. 12
]
Since 1969, Executive Order 11491 has been amended
by Executive Orders 11616, 11636, and 11838. Although minor
in nature when compared with the two previous Orders, the
latter three provide a further refinement to labor relations
in the Federal environment and also grant several minor
privileges to the unions.
As direct result of the concessions made by the
Government, in the Executive Orders issued by Kennedy and
Nixon to improve labor-management relations. Federal sector
unions experienced remarkable growth from 1960 to 1975. For
example, between 1950 and 1970, the number of Federal
employees with active membership in AFGE grew by 362
percent. By 1975, AFGE had approximately 300,000 members
and represented about 700,000 employees in its contracts
with government agencies. In the Department of Defense
alone, AFGE had 150,000 members and represented more than
392,000 of the Department's 992,000 civilian employees [ Nav^
2j=ies 24 September 1977 and Krendel 1977]. Overall, Federal
sector unions represented 1,750,000 Government employees
[Strickland 1976]. However, the Department of Labor
recently reported that membership in both public and private
sector unions had declined, from 1975 through 1977, by 3.8
percent (767,000) overall. In actual numbers. Federal
employee unions lost 100,000 members. This reversed the
15- year trend which began in 1960's [Sun^a^ Peninsula Herald
4 September 1977 ].
Declining membership, which began at about the same
time that the AFGE was considering expanding into the armed
forces, is a serious problem for Federal sector unions.
Ihis is because of at least one very important reason: a
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union's power is closely related to the size of its
membership. The larger the union membership, the more
dollars it receives through dues to support its goals and
the greater the clout its lobbying effort has in influencing
legislation. If it can be assumed that unionism in the
Federal sector will again continue the evolutionary process
and experience the growth that it has in the past, the
question arises: "How will this be manifested?"
One likely answer is unionization of the military.
This is a distinct possibility because of four basic
reasons:
1. military and civil service pay scales have been linked
together for some 10 years in determining the
percentage of annual salary increases. As a result.
Federal sector employee unions are not only directly
representing civilian employees of the Government but
also indirectly representing military personnel in pay
matters.
2. Military personnel, as a group, represent a vast
untapped source of members for Federal sector employee
unions. As previously mentioned, the unions realize
that the number of members a union has is
proportionally, if not exponentially, related to the
power its voice has in Congress. Also, greater
membership means more dollars for the unions to carry
out their programs.
3. AFGE's successful solicitation and use of support from
military personnel to achieve its pay increase
objective in 1974 highlighted the fact that military
personnel and civilian employees could work together




4. Federal sector employee unions have already unionized
the National Guard and Reserve technicans. This has
given Federal sector employee unions basic experience
in dealing with the fringes of the military
establishment on the rights and benefits of
quasi- military personnel.
The first three of the above reasons have been
previously discussed in detail (see Chapter II) and will not
be discussed further at this point. However, the subject
matter — unionization of the Guard/Reserve technicans — of
the fourth reason will be examined in detail in the
following section . This will be done because of the broad
implications of union activity so closely associated with
the armed forces and the potential precedents inherent
therein.
2. Unionization of Guard and Reserve Technicians
With the passing of the National Guard Act of 1968
(PL 90-486) the door to military unionization was set ajar.
This law allowed, commencing on January 1969, National Guard
and Reserve technicans for the first time to be considered
Federal employees and enabled them to join, participate in,
and be represented by labor unions.
Guard and Reserve personnel fall into two
categories: (1) part-time reservists and (2) full-time
civilian technicans who, as a condition of employment, are
required to join the Guard or Reserve and perform week-end
and summer duty as military personnel. Since technicans
work full-time for the Guard and Reserve, they provide a
stable core of professionals around whom most unit
activities revolve. Each technician is both a Federal civil
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servant and a aiember of the uniformed military (officer and
enlisted) earning pay and retirement credit for weekend and
active duty training periods as would any reservist.
Prior to the 1968 National Guard Act, technicans
were paid by the federal Government, but because they were
classified as state employees there was no single retirement
or fringe benefit program. Conditions varied widely from
state to state. It was this shortcoming which prompted the
National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) to
lobby in Congress for a single retirement and benefit
package for all Guard and Reserve technicans. As a result
of this pressure, the National Guard Act was passed. The
Act converted the status of the technicans to that of
Federal employees, required their membership in the Guard or
Reserve as a condition of employment, granted them, a Civil
Service retirement program, gave credit for past technican
service for Federal fringe benefits, and placed a ceiling on
the number of technicans which could be employed. [A'Hearn
1974]
The immediate result of this Act was that the
technicans were now covered by the Kennedy and Nixon
Executive Orders which enabled them to be collectively
represented by labor unions. Almost immediately, two
existing Federal employee unions, AFGE and the National
Association of Government Employees (NAGE) , and two newly
formed unions, the Association of Civilian Technicans (ACT)
and the National Air and Army Technicans Association
(NAATA) , began to organize the technicans. In the period
that followed, which was hindered by management inertia,
unit commanders and managers fo tnd themselves unprepared to
deal effectively with union intervention. After the initial
period of adjustment three things became apparent: (1)
management's .discretionary power had narrowed; (2)
management became more aware of personnel problems and more
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cognizant of its own position on personnel matters; and, (3)
there was no reduction in military efficiency. [Strickland
1976 and Krendel 1977]
More recently, the National Guard Act has played a
role in yet another significant event in the evolution of
Federal sector labor relations. Early in December 1975, a
union which grew from the provisions of this law, the
Association of Civilian Technicans (ACT) , began a drive to
organize part-time Army, Navy, and Air Force reservists.
Vincent J. Paterno, the President of the 8,000-member ACT,
has stated that he believes his union's newly-created
affiliate, the Association of Guard and Reserve (AGS)
,
should represent reservists because the reservists and
civilian technicans have many interests in common. AGR's
objective is to provide reservists with a voice in policy
decisions and to prevent cuts in Reserve component programs.
Existing organizations such , as NGAUS and ROA have been
criticized by Paternc for being too close to the Pentagon
and too far from their members. AGR's membership goal is
100,000 of the 700,000 members of the National Guard and
Reserve. Even though membership figures have not been
publicly disclosed, union representatives claim to be
"elated over the response" by both officers and enlisted
personnel. [Air Force Times 5 January 1976, 10 May 1976,
and 19 July 1976]
About the same time that ACT announced its plan to
unionize the National Guard and Reserve, the largest Federal
employee union, AFGE, announced that it was studying the
possibility of taking members of the uniformed military
services into its membership.
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3 • Expansion into the Active Armed Forces
AFGE is the only significant union which has
seriously considered, for any length of time, unionizing
members of the active duty armed forces. Several other
unions (Teamsters, National Maritime Union, etc.) have
briefly looked into the feasibility of such an action and
have then guickly discarded the idea. AFGE's interest in
unionizing the military developed to such an extent that
delegates to its national convention voted during September
1976 to amend the AFSE Constitution to make armed forces
personnel eligible for membership. In part. Article II of
the AFGE Constitution- reads:
SEC. 1. (a) All employees of the United States Government,
However, as a result of solidifying opposition in
Congress and proposed legislation to ban military unions,
the AFGE decided to re-evaluate its position prior to
actually commencing a membership drive for military
personnel. It did this by asking its locals to conduct
voting to determine if the AFGE should proceed with plans to
unionize the military. The results which were made public
during September 1977 showed a four-to-one margin against
organizing the military. Even though the AFGE's President,
Kenneth Blaylock, has stated that unionization of the
military is now "a dead issue," he has not ruled out the
possibility of organizing the military in the future and has
stated that he will continue to 'watch out for military




If Federal employee unions do decide to continue
their expapsion into the military in the future, what can
they offer military members that existing military
associations cannot offer? In this regard, it must be
remembered that, as with civilian Federal employees, any
union choosing to represent military personnel can have only
the legal authority accorded them by the Federal Government.
At present, existing laws place military union activity at
about the point public sector unions were prior to Executive
Order 10988. [tlossberg 1975] .
During the era prior to Executive Order 10988,
public sector unions ran effective legislative lobbying
programs, processed complaints, and represented members in
appeal actions [Mossberg 1975]'. In other words, today, an
organization calling itself a military union could come into
existence, but its activities would be restricted to the
activities currently being carried on by the six military
associations (see Chapter IV) . If, however. Executive Order
11491 was amended or legislation passed to afford military
personnel the same rights that civilian Federal employees
enjoy, the situation would change significantly, since
collective bargaining and third-party mediation would be
introduced [U.S. Federal Labor Relations Council 1975]. In
order for this possiblility to occur, it would be necessary
for significant numbers of the general public, tne
leadership of the military, and military personnel to show
some support for such a move. The next section of this
chapter will examine the views of the nation's population
concerning the unionization of the military issue.
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D. OPINIONS ON THE UNIONIZATION OP THE MILITARY
Even if laws such as the anti-railitary union bill (5.
274) , now pending in Congress, are enacted and regulations
such as Department of Defense Directive 1354.1 are written
to ban military unionization, they will be ineffective and
not preclude military unions if not supported by the general
public, service personnel, and the leadership of the armed
forces. Therefore, an important question must be answered:
"What do the people of our country want?" [Thurmond 1977],




1 . , View^ of the General Public
Several surveys have been conducted to ascertain the
general public's disposition on the military union issue.
Some of these have biased their results by the manner in
which they presented their questions to the public and/or by
coupling the military union issue to a right to strike
question (an often inflammatory issue which tends to bias
other responses in the survey) . None of the several surveys
reviewed by the author attempted to define a military union,
but relied instead on the individual's understanding of the
term.
One survey which appears to have been structured in
an unbiased manner was conducted earlier this year. This
was a nationwide Gallop Poll survey which asked the
question: "Would you favor or oppose unionization of the
American armed forces?" Seventy-four percent opposed the
idea, 13 percent favored it, and 10 percent had no opinion.
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Interestingly enough, opposition to organizing the armed
forces was found to be nearly as great among union as
nonunion families. Both groups were opposed to the idea —
71 percent to 16 percent and 74 percent to 10 percent,
respectively, f Los Angeles Time§ 1977] -
A previous survey conducted by the Public Services
Research Council during 1976 linked two questions together
and asked: "Do you favor or oppose members of the U. 3.
Armed Forces being organized into unions?" And, "Do you
believe members of the Armed Forces should be permitted to
go on strike?" These questions were passed to 1,529 people
nationwide and it was found that 82 percent opposed both
unionization and striking in the armed forces. The
strongest opposition came from: those over 45 years of age;
those with education beyond high school; and, those who were
not affiliated with a union in the private sector. The
greatest support came from those between 18 and 24 years of
age and racial minorities. [Acmx July 1976 and Thurmond
1977]
Two other surveys which are completely biased in
their questioning are also being conducted. One is
supported by Senator Helms and is being conducted by
Americans Aqainst Union Control of Government. The other is
supported by Senator 3arn and is being conducted by The
Heritage Foundation. Neither will be discussed at greater
length in this thesis, but both are mentioned at this point
to make the reader aware of their existence, r Navy Times 11
July 1977]
Also of interest is a study which was completed in
1976 by Kramer Associates for the Department of Defense.
This report examined the history of unionization within the
public safety services (police, firemen, etc.) field and
determined that public resistance to the idea of military
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unions may be declining. The study indicates that there
was, at one time, widespread fear of "great public
inconvenience and injury" that might occur as a result of
the unionization of police, firemen, teachers, nurses, and
other public employees. Now, however, this apprehension
"has been largely dissipated by the failure of any such
calamities to appear" and this in turn has lowered "the
ultimate barrier to negotiations between military people and
defense." For this reason, the study concludes, there is a
"distinct possibility for the forseeabie future of some form
of collective bargaining for military personnel. " [ Kramer
Associates 1976]
Many commentaries which reflect the public's opinion
on the topic of military unions have been published in
regional newspapers. The following sample seems to portray
the general feeling conveyed in this media [Thurmond 1977,
p. 26-29]:
* Ngws and Courier, Charleston, South Carolina, 8 March
1976:
To be for military unionism is to be for a reduction in
discipline and hence efficiency. Anybody who doesn't
believe that should consult the occasions in American
history when military affairs were a matter of bargaining
between troops and leaders. The inevitable outcomes of
such a system are, first, disaster; next, an eager return
to discipline. The American army learned the lessen in
the Civil War.
* Hartf or d Timeg, Hartford, Connecticut, 29 May 1976:
The talk of unionizing the nation's military forces is
disturbing and has frightening implications that this
nation cannot afford to risk. . . .
* Indianapolis News, Indianapolis, Indiana, 25 September
1976:
The possiblity that it ("union militancy] might be extended
to the military is downright alarming, and legislative
prohibitions are clearly in order.
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* Washington Star, Washington, D. C. , 2 October 1976:
Discipline is the indispensable ingredient ia military
operations. The military is not, and cannot ta. a
democratic organization. There is no room for negotiation
or vote on whether commands are to be followed. . . . The
military cannot be compared to private industry, or even
to Federal civilian employment.
* palj.as Morning News, Dallas, Texas, 7 October 1976:
The armed forces depend on obedience to superior
authority; there can be no re-sort by dissatisfied
infantrymen to the mediation of shop stewards. An order
is to be carried out because it is an order.
Unionization would destroy discipline.
In summary, ir can be said that, at present, the
general public is opposed to military unions. Opposition is
strongest when the public is led to believe that military
unions would have the power to strike. Unfortunately, it is
not known what the public's reaction would be to military
unions if they realized that military unions would be, as a
minimum, subject to the same restrictions that are currently
placed on Federal employee unions. However, it appears
reasonable to assume that opposition would be much less than
the aforementioned studies indicated. In any event, the
Kramer study points out that opposition to military unions,
in general, shows signs of declining over time.
2» Views of S ervice P^rsonnej. :^ '
Several studies have been conducted to determine how
military personnel regard military unions. Three of these
will be compared in the following paragraphs to give the
reader an understanding of the military person's point of
view.
The first and best known of these studies was
conducted by T. Roger Manley, et. al. Air Force Institute of
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Technology, during April 1976. The survey questionnaire
consisted of 65 items and was designed to determine the
attitude of active duty Air Force personnel toward military
unionization. The questionnaire was distributed to a
randomly selected sample of 800 officers and 800 enlisted
personnel; a total of 938 completed questionnaires were
returned. [ Manley 1977]
The second study was conducted by Dr. David R.
Segal, et. al. University of Maryland, during the first few
months of 1977. This study was much smaller than the Manley
study and consisted of a sample of 121 active Army personnel
at Fort Benning, Georgia. The Segal study differed from the
Manley study in one other way. It surveyed only personnel
in combat arms. Segal reasoned that because of the Air
Force's dependence on complex technology, relative
non-involvement of its enlisted personnel in combat, and its
virtual lack of a historical military tradition, any study
of the attitudes of Air Force personnel would represent only
the attitudes of the support segment of the armed forces.
Segal's study attempted to provide the missing part of the
picture. [Segal 1977]
The third study, aimed at "mid-career" personnel,
was conducted by James McCollum, et. al, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, during November 1976. Three hundred
and fifty Army personnel (pay grade 0-3 and E-5 through E-7)
were chosen at random to participate in the survey from a
list of officers and noncommissioned officers living in
quarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. McCollum received
responses from 112 recipients. [McCollum 1977]
Below is a generalized interpretation of the key




* Is there a need for military unions?
Man ley Seqal McCollum
No les No Yes ^o Yes
Officers 64% 21% - - 55% 21%
04-06 - - 83% 7% - -
WO-03 - - 71% 2 3%
Enlisted 39% 34% - - 38% 40%
E5-E9 - - 50% 17% - -
E1-E4 - - 27% 33%
* Could military unions prevent the erosion of fringe
benefits?
Man ley Sega l McCollum
No I§§ 12 iS§ I2 ~Isi
Officers 3 1% 56% - - 29% 53%
Enlisted 20% 60% - - 12% 55%
Overall 22% 59% 42% 51% 25% 54%
* Could military unions effectively represent the
interests of military personnel with Congress through
lobbying?
Man ley, Seqal McCollum
N2 ~les No Yes No Yes,
Officers 28% 59% - - - -
Enlisted 16% 57% - - - -
Overall 19% 57% 36% 32%
* Could military unions secure higher pay raises for
their members then would be obtained without them?
M anley Sec[ai McCollum
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Officers 23% 72% - - - -
Enlisted 2 0% 67% - - - -
Overall 20% 68% 36% 45% - -
* Would military unions have a negative effect on
discipline?
Man ley. Sega l Meconium
No "^es No Yes ^o Yes
Officers 19% 72% - - 25% 54%
Enlisted 37% 48% - - 40% 54%
Overall 34% 52% 29% 58% 34% 54%
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^- Views of ihe L ^aderghip of the Armed Forces
President Carter provided his views on efforts to
organize armed forces personnel during a question and answer
period following a March 1977 speech at the Pentagon:
My own opinion, which is strongly held, is that it
would not be advisable to have the military personnel
unionized. ...
I don't know of any strong move in that direction. I
believe that most of the leaders of our national and
international labor unions agree. I have never had any of
those leaders approach me with the intention of going
forward with this effort.
I know it has been discussed in isolated areas and by
some responsible people, but I think the national leaders,
even in the labor movement, have no commitment to this
proposition, f Ar.med Forces Jourqal April 1977, p. 19]
Within the Deparment of Defense, both civilian and
military leaders are in total opposition to any union role
in the uniformed military and they speak with what amounts
to a single voice on the subject. Key leaders have
expressed the following views:
* Secretary of Defense Harold Brown:
The armed forces of the United States occupy a unique
position in society. They require specialized management
and a uniquely high degree of discipline and sacrifice for
the proper performance of their duties. The relation
between a member of the armed forces and his superiors, or
between the soldier and the government, is not an
employee-employer relationship.
Moreover, our military force is a vital element in the
execution of U. S. foreign policy. The functional role of
our armed forces demands absolute certainty of immediate
and total responsiveness to lawful orders. Since the
changing nature of warfare has consistently decreased
available reaction time, our military must be quickly and
completely responsive to external threats. Inherent in
this requirement is the need for an unencumbered command
and control system.
The collective bargaining process is fundamentally
incompatible with this basic requirement. Collective
bargaining, with its aspects of shared decision-making and
forms of consultation prior to action, cannot accord with
the basic requirements of the U. S. military in the
performance of its mission in terms of undivided command
authority and immediate reliable responsiveness to that
authority.
Moreover, the effectiveness of our military force in
support of foreign policy is founded in its apparent
capability to perform its assigned missions. This is
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justifiably based upon a proven history of effective
parformance under a system of unified command authority.
Any uncertainty of our future performance inherent in the
introduction of another control system for our military
personnel could weaken our credibility in the eyes of
foreign nations. r Navy Times 11 April 1977, p. 34]
* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George
S. Brown:
I think unionization and the operation of the military
forces are totally incompatible. . . . Military
personnel cannot live up to the oath of service and still
work under a union contract. We cannot have it. [Navy
Times 23 February 1976, p. 30]
* Chief cf Naval Operations Admiral Holloway:
I believe unionization, in the sense that there would be
collective bargaining to determine whether or not certain
operations would be undertaken, is unthinkable in a
military sense. However, it is my belief that our
military people will probably start using associations
such as the Fleet Reserve Association to a much greater
degree to have their rights and privileges looked after on
a much broader scale, I think and hope that will be the
trend for the future. [ Whisler 1977]
* Army Chief of Staff General Rogers:
We don't need any unions to represent our soldiers -- that
is a responsibility of the Array leadership. [ Arniy Times
25 October 1976, p. 8] ""^
—
* Chief of Naval Personnel Vice Admiral Watkins
From the perspective of the Service Personnel Chiefs, it
is certain that a union presence would seriously impact on
the personnel management field. . . . Assuming current
operational requirements remained unchanged, personnel
costs in all areas could soar due to competition for more
personnel dollars in the budget process. More time and
manpower could be required to process personnel actions on
an individual rather than policy basis. All experience
indicates that a climate for development of adversary
relationships within the chain of command would be
created. The Services' experience with the organized
activities of anti-Vietnam War dissidents graphicallly
i^-lustrated how entry of collective actions into the
military can disrupt the required orderly functioning of
the chain of command and adversely impact upon the morale
of all military personnel. [Watkins 1977, p. 10]
The reasons most often cited by civilian and
military leaders within the Department of Defense for their
opposition to military unions are as follows:
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1. Union representation of active duty military personnel
would undermine the chain of command and erode
military discipline
2. Sound leadership and management obviate the need for
union representation of armed forces personnel
3. Congressional support for the fundamental needs of
military personnel obviate any need for a union
representation [Taylor, W. April 1977]
Equaling the opposition to military unions of the
leaders in the Department of Defense is the United States
Senate. This is best evidenced by this body's 72 - 3 roll
call vote passing a bill (S. 274) to prohibit labor unions
in the armed forces (this bill is discussed in an earlier
chapter) on 16 September 1977. [ Won te r ejr geninsula Herald
17 September 1977]
The position of the House of Representatives on the
subject is not as clearly defined. However, the general
attitude of the House appears to have been summed up by
Bepresentat ive Mahon, Chairman of both the Defense
Subcommittee and the parent House Appropriations Committee,
when he stated: "I am appalled that we are even discussing
unionizing. I know that there has been some erosion (of
benefits) but I hope not to the point that we need unions."
CNavi Ti mes 23 February 1976]
A similar view is held by Representative Stratton:
I am a great believer in unions but, frankly, the whole
idea of unions in the Armed Forces seems entirely out of
place. My gut reaction is that this would be a mistake.
Congress is the place where service personnel should turn
if they have a problem. [ Whisler 1977]
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More recently. Representative Stratton provided a
clear indication of how the House plans to deal with the
military union issue when he predicted that the Senate's
bill (S.274) would be passed during the current session and
then sent x.o the President early in 1978 [ Na,Kl Times 24
October 1977]
E. WESTERN EUROPEAN MILITARY UNIONS
It is generally accepted and has been widely publicized
that collective action groups of the military union variety
exist in seven Western European countries — Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Both proponents and
opponents of unions in the armed forces of this nation have
made the assumption that the Western European experience is
relevant to the military union issue in the United States.
They have then proceeded to use analogies to argue their pro
or con view of military unions in this country. However, at
this point, one must ask.: "Is the European experience
relevant to the situation in the United States?" To answer
this question, to determine ho v European military unions
operate, and to see what they have done for their members,
military unionism in each of these nations will be reviewed
in the following paragraphs.
1. Austria
Austria has a total armed force of 12,300 regular,
25,000 conscripts, and a total mobilization strength of
150,000. The mission of its military is self-defense and
the nation has declared itself neutral. Austria has a
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socialistic form of government in which political parties
derive their power base from the trade unions of which the
military is a part. [Hagen 1975]
The Austrian experience with military unions dates
back to 1920. The experience lasted for 1U years and
represents the world's only experience with a unionized
all-volunteer force. Even though military union membership
was again authorized in 1945, it was not until 1967 that
military personnel began taking an active role. At that
time a branch of the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ATUF)
was designated to represent officers and noncommissioned
officers. While the parent union is able to strike and no
law or regulation precludes the military branch from
striking, the military union adheres to a self-imposed
no-strike policy. The union's authority is restricted to
collective bargaining on economic and welfare matters and it
cannot interfere with military decisions. During periods of
national emergency, Austrian law prohibits union involvement
with military personnel. Currently, approximately 66
percent of Austria's officers and 75 percent of its
noncommissioned officers are union members. [Hagen 1975 and
Taylor, W. August 1977]
Military members of the ATUF enjoy the same rights
and privileges as civilian members of the union. Benefits
claimed by the union include pay raises, increased leave
with pay, and uniform allowances for field training. [Hagen
1975]
2. Belgium^
Belgium is a member of NATO and has armed forces
totaling 90,000. The nation is plagued by economic crisis,
unemployment, political fragmentacion and linguistic
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quarrels. The political system, within which military
unions can align themselves with a political party, is
dominated by social democrats. [Hagen 1975 and Taylor, H.
August 1977]
Military personnel have been authorized to join
trade unions which are recognized as representing personnel
in the civil service since 1975. The Ministry of Defense
recognizes three unions — one each for officers,
noncommissioned officers, and corporals and below (excluding
draftees) . By law these unions are permitted to
collectively bargain for higher pay and for changes in
working conditions including reduced working hours but are
prohibited from striking or dealing with matters involving
discipline. [Hhisler 1977]
fragmented by trade and religious affiliations,
Belgium's military unions have had difficulty in acting
cohesively. Despite this failing, union pressure has
resulted in a 40-hour work week and overtime compensation.
Currently, military union membership is estimated to be only
10 percent of the armed force, but this percent is growing
rapidly. [Cortright 1976]
3. Deamark
Denmark is governed by Social Democrats, has an
armed forces totaling 37,000, and is a NATO member. The
nation is highly unionized with 900,000 workers (about 95
percent of the work force) out of a population of five
million belonging to 70 national trade unions. [Hagen 1975]
Since 1922, Denmark has permitted military personnel
to join unions which collectively bargain at the national
level with the Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Finance on
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such matters as pay, benefits, and working conditions.
Fourteen separate but cooperating organizations for officers
and one main organization with several sub-organizations for
enlisted personnel are in existence. Membership in one of
these organizations is virtually automatic unless
specifically declined. As a result, 98 percent of the
career officers (including flag officers) and 92 percent of
the career enlisted personnel (draftees are not eligible)
are union members. [Hagen 1975, Whisler 1977, and Taylor,
C. August 1977]
Military unions are prohibited by law from striking,
cannot engags in command matters, and have little power over
the functioning of the armed forces. Regardless of the
limitations, these unions have negotiated improvements in
basic pay, working conditions, special pay for overtime
(over 40 hours), and uniform reimbursement. The unions also
provide legal assistance to their members in grievance
procedures and assist them in insurance planning. [Hagen
1975 and Cortright 1976]
^ • Federal Republic of Ger many
west Germany is a key member of NATO and its armed
forces number 490,000. Like many other Western European
countries, the German society is highly unionized. By law,
military personnel are permitted to join unions and
associations to safeguard and improve working and economic
conditions, but as in the civilian sector^ the military is
not permitted to strike. Salaries and working conditions
are fixed by law and not by collective bargaining. However,
the military union (5,000 members) through its parent union,
the Public Services and Transportation Union (OTV) , is
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successful in supporting and placing its own members in both
Parliament and the executive and is thereby able to
influence the outcome of various relevant laws. [Hagan
1975, Whisler 1977, and Taylor, W. August 1977]
In terms of membership, military unionism in Germany
has not been very successful. This can ba attributed to
three factors: (1) service personnel prefer to belong to the
military association known as the Bundeswehr Verbande (52
percent of the armed forces — private first class to
four-star general — are members) ; (2) conscripts have
little interest in joining for the 15 months that they will
be in the armed forces; and, (3) the professional military
distrusts the union and discourages would-be members.
[Strickland 1976, Whisler 1977, and Taylor, W. August 1977]
The OTV and Bundeswehr Verbande which in reality are
very similar, complement each other in garnering favorable
action for armed forces personnel in the non-military
aspects of service life -- better pay, easier promotions,
increased recreational facilities, better health coverage,
and a pension plan which is comparable to ether sectors of
the German economy. By agreement, both the association and
union do not enter into grievances over duty matters or
interfere with discipline. [Hagen 1975, AUSA May 1976, Kane
1976]
5. The Netherlands -
Holland has a Social Democratic form of government,
an armed forces totaling approximately 60,000, and is a NATO
partner. Since 1921, the armed forces have had a system of
institutionalized consultation without collective bargaining
or the right to strike. Institutional consultation means
that discussions between representatives of' military unions
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and officials of the armed forces take place on matters of
mutual concern before governmental decisions are
implemented. This process is accomplished through the
monthly meetings of the Central Committee on the
Institutional Consultation of the Military which is made up
of elected representatives from 12 officially recognized
military employee organizations (four officer, five
noncommissioned officer, one corporal, and two conscript)
and appropriate Defense 'Ministry officials. This Committee
is chaired by the Minister of Defense. [Spaith 1976, Kane
1976, and Hhisler 1977]
Eighty percent of all military personnel belong to
the 12 military unions. Outside of Holland, the best known
of these is the larger of the two conscript unions, the
Organization of Conscripted Soldiers (VVDd) . Founded in
1966, WDM has approximately 25,000 members (about 50
percent of the conscripts) . In its early years the union
was aided by progressive Dutch officers schooled in theories
of modern management. In 1969, the viability of the WDM
was enhanced when the government granted such privileges as
automatic dues withholding, free office space, and payment
for the time spent on the union's activities by its seven
elected officers. Through a mass protest in 1971, the
conscripts forced the Defense Ministry to allow hair length
to be left to the individual's choice. Since that time
patitioris and demonstrations have accomplished the
following:
1. Pay has been increased to the mandatory minimum
civilian youth wage for a person of 20
2. Inspections and unnecessary formations have been
eliminated
3. Saluting is optional
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4. The military penal code has been reformed, abolishing
close detention and reduction in rank
5. New billeting standards have been estaolished and
various facilities have been modernized [Kane 1976 and
Cortright 1977] y
6 . Norway
Norway has a population of 4,000,000 and armed
forces of roughly 35,000. The nation is governed by Social
Democrats and highly unionized. In fact, trade unions play
a key part in the political process and are part of the
ruling party. Therefore, it should not be surprising that
Norway had the first military unions. [Hagan 1975 and
Taylor, ». August 1977]
The early military unions were professional and
social associations which began about 1835. Today, there
are two major federations under which military unions are
organized — the Norwegian Federation of Labor (LO) and the
Joint Organization of Officers and Sergeants (BFO) . LO
represents the vast majority of Labor unions in Norway.
However, most military unions are affiliated with BFO which
represents net only military personnel but also the national
policemen. Membership in a union for all career officers
and noncommissioned officers is not only mandatory but
essential. As a result, 90 percent of all officers and 70
percent of the enlisted members of the armed forces are
members. [Strickland 1976, Taylor, H. August 1977, and
Whisler 1977]
Union membership is essential because of Norway's
unique system of determining military pay. Through this
system, each labor federation collectively bargains with the
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National Pri-ce Board for the pay of its members to arrive at
a two or three-year contract. Without a federation,
military personnel would not be represented before the
National Price Board. In addition to performing this
essential function, the federations also collectively
bargain with the government on overtime limitations,
housing, retirement and other social benefits. However,
federations and affiliated military unions are not permitted
to strike against the military or interfere with military
law; in times of war or other national emergencies, they are
also precluded from representing their members. [Quinn
1971, AUSA May 1976, and Deline 1977]
Conscripts, who serve from 12 to 15 months on active
duty, are not permitted to join one of the military unions
or to form their own. There is, however, an informal
"Telletsmann" system which permits draftees to elect the
equivalent of shop stewards at the unit level to represent
them outside of the chain of command. [Strickland 1976 and
Whisler 1977]
7. Sweden
Sweden has a small standing armed forces but is able
to mobilize to a strength of 75 0,000. Like Norway, this
country is governed by Social Democrats and is highly
unionized. Sweden's military unions came into existence in
1965 with the enactment of the State Officials Act which
extended the private sector's collective bargaining rights
over wages and working conditions to nearly all military
personnel and national civil servants.
The vast majority (99 percent) of all officers,
warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers belong to
their respective unions. Conscripts are not authorized to
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belong to a nilitary union but can and usually do maintain
their membership in private sector unions during the seven
to 15 months they are on active duty. Two of the three
military unions, the Company Officers Union and the Platoon
Officers' Union, are affiliated with the Central
Organization of Salaried Employees, the largest white-collar
union in Sweden. The Swedish Officers' Union, the third
military union, is affiliated with a smaller public union
federation. As a result of this arrangement, the large and
powerful public employee unions of Sweden bargain and
negotiate directly with the Government Board for Collective
Bargaining on such matters as job classification, pay, hours
of work, pensions, promotions, job safety, and grievance
procedures for the military unions. A formal labor contract
is concluded every two years. [Hagen 1975, Kane 1976,
Cortright 1977, Taylor, W. August 1977]
Until a few years ago, the Swedish military unions
had the right to strike but, for all practical purposes,
they do not today. However, the public employee unions with
which the military unions are affiliated, do have the right
to strike. [Whisler 1977]
3 • £§iSi^9i^Z. to the United Stat es
The preceeding sections have briefly reviewed
collective action in each of the seven Western European
nations which are widely believed to have military unions in
their armed forces. This review has revealed many
dissimilarities which should be considered whan looking at
the relevancy issxie (i.e., application of the European
military union experience to the situation in the United
States) . Critics who have questioned the relevancy of the
European experience to the American scene have focused on
the following differences to emphasize their point:
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1. A general European military union model which can be
applied to the United States does not exist. Instead,
a different and distinct model has developed in each
country to both fit the nation's unique political
system and social structure and fulfill the collective
action needs of the nation's military personnel.
[Taylor, W. August 1977]
2. The adversary relationship between employers and
collective action groups is less pronounced in the
seven European nations and strikes occur less often
than they do in the United States. [ Parnell 1977 and
Schratz 1977
]
3. European unions play a larger part in determining
government policy and are more integrated into the
government than they are in the United States.
[Schratz 1977 and Taylor, W. August 1977]
4. Each of the seven European nations is far less
racially, culturally, and ethnically heterogeneous
than the United States. [Wright 1977]
5. Conscription is the rule in Europe while the United
States now relies on an All-Volunteer Force. [Krendel
1977 and Taylor, W. August 1977]
6. The armed forces of the European nations are committed
to self-defense within their borders while the United
States has world-wide commitments which are not always
as easily related to the defense of the homeland
(author's observation).
7. The seven European nations for the most part rely on
small standing armies with large reserves that would
be mobilized in an emergency while in the United
States the opposite is true {author's observation).
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Despite the differences described above, which tend
to weaken the relevancy of the European experience to
possible sirailiar activities in the United States, there are
several broad and general inferences which can be extracted.
First, both military unions and military associations appear
to be' highly effective alternatives which can fulfill the
collective action needs of service personnel. While
European military unions have been given credit for
improving compensation and working conditions, not all of
these so-callad military unions are unions. Those in
Germany and the Netherlands, without the right to bargain
collectively, would seem to be more closely related to
military associations in this country. Despite this
limitation, the collective action groups in these countries
do not appear to be less effective than the groups these in
countries which do have the right to collective bargaining.
Is it not possible that military associations in this
country could be as effective as any proposed military
unions?
Second, military unions appear to evolve as a
natural phenomenon from the growth and development of public
sector unions. In each of the seven European nations
discussed, military unions have come into being in this
manner. If public sector unions in this country continue to
grow and gain broader powers, is it net possible that
military unions will be an eventual outcome?
Third, collective bargaining, a vital ingredient for
the existence of military unions, has been effectively
limited to conditions of work, personnel policies, and
grievances. In all cases, European military unions cannot
engage in command matters and have little if any power over
the functioning of the armed forces. Interestingly enough,
European military unions and civilian Federal employee
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unions, a potential source from which military unions could
develop in the United States, are limited in their
collective bargaining to roughly the same issues. If
military unions come into being in this country at some
future date, is it not possible that the use of collective
bargaining cculd be restricted to certain issues?
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VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
During the 1970's military personnel have perceived a
growing need to band together outside the chain-of-coramand
for the purpose of taking collective action. The primary
reason for this is the firming conviction that the
fundamental character of a service career as a respected,
secure way of life, where the leadership of the armed forces
takes care of its own, is being eroded. Hhile military
personnel have seen continuing efforts to improve the
quality of life of civilian counterparts throughout the
American society, they have also seen continuous attacks on,
and a decline in, their comparative standard of living.
While being expected to maintain their personal commitment
to the armed forces, they perceive their traditional
spokesmen before Congress to be less committed to improving
or even maintaining their existing benefits. The efforts in
their behalf by armed forces spokesmen appear to them to be,
at best, merely holding actions to defer further erosions
and not the positive initiatives they have seen in the
civilian sector. To reduce uncertainty over their future
security and to bring the scales back into balance, military
personnel have begun to consider seriously seeking the aid
of collective action groups — military associations and
unions — as a substitute for the leadership of the armed
forces which has traditionally acted as their Washington
level ombudsmen.
Societal forces provide a second reason for the growing
desire for collective action among military personnel. Both
the continuing liberalization of American society and the
substitution of monetary incentives for traditional military
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institutional benefits are seen as contributing factors.
While the liberalization of American society will probably
reduce opposition to the military union form of collective
action group as time passes, the substitution of monetary
incentives as the primary inducement to military service has
had a more immediate and direct effect. This substitution
has shifted the idea of military service from the
institutional model or "calling" to the occupational model.
In the occupational model, because military-man sees
military service as a "job like any other," he no longer
feels that there is something special about his profession.
As a result, military-man places a much higher value on
promoting his self-interests than he did when he believed
the military way of life was a "calling." To achieve his
self-interests, he is looking to collective action groups
for assistance.
A third reason which helps to explain the developing
desire for collective action among military personnel is the
linkage of military pay and civilian pay in the Federal
sector. Because of this linkage, a large and powerful
civilian Federal employee union, the AFGE, has seen itself
as representing military personnel in pay matters with their
common employer, the Federal Government, but the AFGE is not
reaping the added power and wealth that the unionization of
military personnel would bring. To the AFGE, members of the
military appear to be "free-loading." In order to change
this situation, the AFGE started a publicity campaign in
1975 to lay the ground work for military unionization. The
objective of this campaign was to enhance dissatisfaction
and to point out how collective action groups of the union
variety could help military personnel obtain and retain
their rightful share of the nation's wealth.
To fulfill the growing need for collective action in the
armed forces there are two distinct types of collective
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action groups which could be used by military personnel —
military unions and military associations. While both offer
certain advantages and disadvantages, military personnel
have in the past generally avoided a critical untiased
comparison of the two forms of collective action groups.
Instead, members of the armed forces have tended to view
military unions as a complete panacea, while disregarding
the potential utility of military associations. In general,
this appears to have been due to the large volume of
publicity generated on military unions subsequent to the 27
June 1975 article in the Wall Street Journal — the article
which broke the news that the AFGE was studying the
possibility of taking uniformed armed forces personnel into
its membership. Another factor which caused military unions
to be seen as a panacea was the successes of Western
European military unions in vastly improving pay, benefits,
and working conditions of service personnel during the
1970's. A third factor was the belief, exploited by the
AFGE to serve its own purposes, that military associations
had not been very effective in protecting the rights and
benefits of service personnel in the past.
A difficulty which must be faced in a comparison between
military associations and military unions in this country is
the fact that the former exists and the latter does not.
The author attempted to overcome this problem by using a
surrogate — civilian Federal employee unions. The
rationale behind the choice of this surrogate is : (1)
civilian Federal employee unions are the likeliest source of
any future military unionization effort (see Chapter V) ; (2)
they have experience dealing with the common employer, the
Federal Government, of their members and military personnel;
and, (3) they operate within a set of laws and regulations
which would more closely approximate future possibilities in




Osing the surrogate approach, a comparison of the
advantages and disadvantages of military associations and
unions reveals a number of key points. First, through
various publications, military associations are doing a
highly satisfactory job of keeping their members informed of
existing and pending laws and regulations which effect or
could effect their members. in examination of similiar
publications distributed by existing civilian Federal
employee unions reveals that they too do a highly effective
job in this area.
Second, both military associations and civilian Federal
employee unions have had successes in achieving their goals
and objectives and both have had failures. Both use
congressional lobbyists to influence legislation, but
because of the right to collective bargaining, civilian
Federal employee unions appear to have been more successful
in improving the economic conditions of their members than
have military associations. However, since civilian Federal
employee unions would have to operate under a mora
restrictive set of laws and regulations in the military
environment — one which does not allow collective
bargaining — it is doubtful if they could have been or
would be more effective than the military associations are
under this condition.
Third, military associations and civilian Federal
employee unions can improve their effectiveness by
increasing their memberships. Both associations and unions
are firmly convinced that this a basic truth. One of the
primary reasons given by civilian Federal employee unions
for their past sujccesses has been their large numbers of
members. On the other hand, the reason most often given by
military associations for not being more effective is the
lack of support from military personnel who have not, until
recently, felt the need for collective action.
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Fourth, an organization of military personnel calling
itself a military union or seen as a military union because
of its affiliation with a civilian Federal employee union
would be less acceptable to the leadership of the armed
forces and the general public. A military union would,
therefore, meet with stiffer resistance to its goals and
objectives than would a military association. While many of
those whc are part of the leadership of the armed forces
have voiced strong opposition to military unions, they have
at the same time actively encouraged service personnel to
join and support military associations.
Fifth, while civilian Federal employee unions have
gained some experience in dealing with the military
establishment on employee rights and benefits through their
representation of National Guard and Reserve technicans,
they lack the vast experience that military associations
have accumulated through their many years of working closely
with the leadership of the armed forces to improve the
rights and benefits of service personnel. In addition, the
executive positions of the various associations are almost
entirely filled by retired and active military personnel who
have had many years of service experience, have a close
relationship with the military establishment, and have a
good idea of what military personnel need and want. On the
other hand, civilian Federal employee unions are staffed
almost entirely by active or retired civilian Government
employees who see the world in a different light than do
military personnel.
Sixth, both military associations and civilian Federal
employee unions have as their primary objective the
protection and improvement of the economic well-being of
their members. Civilian Federal employee unions have, in
addition, sought to improve the working conditions and
personnel policies affecting their members. Only recently
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have a few of the military asssociations become interested
and involved in these areas. However, if the need for
collective action continues to grow in the armed forces, it
seems likely that military association members will come to
demand that their associations take a more active part in
helping them achieve what they believe to be equity in a
broader range of personnel matters.
An extensive examination of collective action groups has
led the authcr to conclude that both military associations
and military unions are viable means by which military
personnel, in general, can achieve collective action.
However, due to many obstacles which are not likely to
disappear in the foreseeable future, the military union form
of collective action group does not appear to be an
available alternative for United States military personnel
to fulfill their collective action needs. Foremost among
these obstacles is an existing Department of Defense
regulation against unionization which it appears will be
coupled with strongly supported anti-military union
legislation now pending in Congress. While the Defense
regulation makes membership in a military union by service
personnel a punishable offense under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, the pending legislation is even tougher.
It will not only make military union membership a felony,
punishable in civilian courts, but will also make the
existence of military unions unlawful (see Chapter III) . A
second and closely related obstacle is the strong opposition
voiced by the general public, the press, the President,
Congress, civilian and military leaders within the
Department of Defense, and members of Federal sector
employee unions. Without significant support, or at least
indifference by the general pubic and press, it is highly
unlikely that a President or member of Congress would
jeopardize his political career to give military unions the
support which would cause sanctions against them to be
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mitigated. a third obstacle which will cause the status quo
to continue is the fact that court challenges to the
existing regulations and the pending legislation when
enacted, are very likely to be unsuccessful. This view is
based on: (1) the Supreme Court's past reluctance to
interfere with the President and the Congress in the
exercise of their constitutionally mandated power to
regulate, govern, and operate the armed forces; and, (2) the
concept of military necessity which allows individual
liberties protected under the Bill of Rights to be
restricted when higher needs of the nation are involved (see
Chapter III)
.
At a December meeting of the Monterey Peninsula Chapter
of NCOA, United States Representative Leon Panetta told the
Association's members that, "You [the military community]
will be set aside if you don't get involved in the
legislative process. It is the squeaking wheel that draws
the grease. " Since this is a reality of the American system
of government, there is a definite need for some form of
collective action group to represent the personnel of the
armed forces. Because military associations have been
effective and can be more so if larger numbers of military
personnel join them, because they are legal, and because
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